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SMTP doesn't really prevent end-to-end crypto for email. There's a lot of reasons why that's hard that have nothing to do with SMTP: - multiple devices shar
by cryptonector 4y ago
SMTP doesn't really prevent end-to-end crypto for email. There's a lot of reasons why that's hard that have nothing to do with SMTP:
- multiple devices sharing a mailbox
- store in plaintext?
- if store in ciphertext, how to index, search?
- how to share decryption, signing keys among devices?
- how to enroll devices?
- how to exchange keys?
These problems are easier to solve for IM because it's interactive, not store-and-forward.
- GekkePrutser 4y agoIt doesn't prevent it, no. But the protocol for email as a whole should incorporate it in a simple manner. In terms of "End to End" I would consider the user the endpoint, not the device. There's many techniques that can make that happen. But this is more on the receiver side of course. PGP is obviously not simple. S/MIME is also not simple. This is why nobody bothers using either (though S/MIME is used internally within a lot of corporations).
- cryptonector 4y agoThe only way I can see of retrofitting end-to-end encryption into email is to use DNSSEC / DANE. But this will require new MUAs. DANE for SMTP, however, has created pretty good email security -- hop-by-hop, yes, but it's much better than before.
- tptacek 4y agoIf all you care about is hop-by-hop security, you can accomplish that without DANE (which requires a forklift upgrade of DNS records across the Internet to work) --- this is why Microsoft and Google came up with MTA-STS.