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Just because you use math dose not mean its more scientific, it just looks more like science. Hayek called this sientism. It does not make sence to use math-mod
by nickik 15y ago
Just because you use math dose not mean its more scientific, it just looks more like science. Hayek called this sientism. It does not make sence to use math-models in economics because its a social science, you cant model human behavior the same why you can with atoms.
Hayek worked a log on this kind of stuff you should check it out. For example his nobel price lecture "The Pretence of Knowledge" http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1974/hayek-lecture.html http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1...
- notahacker 15y agoThere seem to be two issues at stake here. The first is whether mathematical models are appropriate and adequate to explain human behaviour. Here I have a lot of sympathy with Austrian arguments, but it's quite clear they overstate the case. Sure, economic models, like meteorological models, are rather looser and more speculative than Newtonian classical mechanics, but there are multimillion dollar industries that have grown up based on mathematical models of human behaviour; denying the obvious predictive power of at least some models of human behaviour seems akin to denying that one can make assumptions about natural selection because actions of lifeforms appear to be indeterminate. It's not like physical sciences are devoid of controversies over models either. Hayek alluded to the problem of inferring a relationship between inflation and full employment from too small a sample, but Milton Friedman got a Nobel prize for predicting the breakdown of the relationship with an economic model. In the long run, economists might all be wrong about something, but at least most conventional ones they have the intellectual honesty to admit to the possibility theirtheories might be demonstrably false. The second question is whether Austrian economists have something more compelling to offer than mathematical models. The answer, so far as I can tell, is no. They have A number of interesting ideas, many of which neoclassical authors have tried to develop as models rather than simply assert them as a priori truths. But praxaeology comes across as pure sophistry of the worst kind; Rothbard's "Praxaeology" paper might claim that it's intended to be a set of axioms where A implies B but he then goes on to provide an example which consists of rather elementary and mostly uncontroversial statements most of which simply dont imply each other at all Sample: "that a man acts implies that he will make a difference...action therefore implies that man does not have omniscient knowledge of the future" http://mises.org/rothbard/praxeology.pdf http://mises.org/rothbard/praxeology.pdf Obviously, when it comes to more controversial statements it's necessary to stretch the definition of "imply" a little further in order to paint your pet theory as a priori truth. But even while discussing something as indisputably empirically true as human nonomniscience, that sort of woolly argument is enough to make even the most superficial mathematical model a lot more compelling. In defence of bad application of math, it's less of a dead end than bad application of philosophy