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Ok, so the NSA could have replaced the phone numbers we sent each other, which means that we can't be sure that the NSA isn't intercepting our file transfer lat
by DANK_YACHT 4y ago
Ok, so the NSA could have replaced the phone numbers we sent each other, which means that we can't be sure that the NSA isn't intercepting our file transfer later, which is the exact same issue we would face had we using HTTPS to transfer the file, except we did a lot more work (e.g. exchanged numbers, texted file hashes, compared check sums, etc.).
btw, citation needed that the NSA is able to decrypt https traffic.
- peoplefromibiza 4y ago> Ok, so the NSA could have replaced the phone numbers we sent each other What if we're living in a black hole and our universe is a white hole? > except we did a lot more work Or we trust the sender to not be malevolent and/or compromised, like Debian did for more than 20 years. I don't understand why people live like they are surrounded by enemies in enemy territory, given it's not usually the case. HTTP is perfectly fine, unless you have reason to not use HTTP. They exists, but it's not always necessary. Also: 99% of corporate networks install self signed certs and override the certification authority, so traffic is inspectable. Some mobile network operators do the same things when they sell to customers "secure network" upgrades. HTTPS is not a panacea. You simply trust a different set of "authorities" that none of us know or control.
- danShumway 4y ago> Or we trust the sender to not be malevolent and/or compromised, like Debian did for more than 20 years. I mentioned this above, but when was Debian ever doing this? I don't think I've ever used a package manager that wasn't at least making some attempt to secure against MITM attacks and compromised CDNs. > Or we trust the sender to not be malevolent and/or compromised That's not what HTTPS protects against, HTTPS is designed to protect against MITM attacks. It doesn't inherently have anything to do with verifying identity, and we've actively moved away from identity verification in the SSL world, because the companies trying to do identity verification to determine which certificates were "verified" added very little security to the process and were mostly a waste of money. LetsEncrypt pretty much only cares whether or not you control the domain you say you control. It doesn't verify your identity past that point, because that's not its job. It solves a specific problem. > Also: 99% of corporate networks install self signed certs and override the certification authority, so traffic is inspectable. I don't personally like when companies do this, but it's not breaking HTTPS. If the user or device owner imports a certificate authority, then the browser should trust it. Isn't that the whole criticism people have with HTTPS, that they don't like gatekeepers? They should be happy that device owners can swap out certificate authorities. > HTTPS is not a panacea. Carrots and spinach are not a health panacea, but that doesn't mean I'm obligated to eat dirt instead. There are definitely alternative schemes that could be used in the browser other than HTTPS. It's OK if you don't like HTTPS in specific. But that doesn't mean HTTP is secure.
- peoplefromibiza 4y ago> I mentioned this above, but when was Debian ever doing this? I They are still doing it! On my system (this one's not Debian, but KDE Neon) $ cat /etc/apt/sources.list deb http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/ focal main restricted universe multiverse deb http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/ focal-security main restricted universe multiverse > That's not what HTTPS protects against, HTTPS is designed to protect against MITM attacks That need a MITM Which is a specific type of attack. If you are running a network where that's not possible, you're fine. > LetsEncrypt pretty much only cares whether or not you control the domain you say you control LetsEncrypt is pretty much an advanced tool, for advanced users > I don't personally like when companies do this, but it's not breaking HTTPS. It's breaking confidentiality. Which is one of the features of HTTPS In a corporate network MITM attacks are not that easy to pull off. So basically HTTPS main feature is encryption of content in that context. > Carrots and spinach are not a health panacea, but that doesn't mean I'm obligated to eat dirt instead. first of all, carrots and spinach are a panacea. Secondly, HTTP is not dirt. Like SMTP is not dirt and IRC is not dirt and FTP is not dirt and TFTP is not dirt > But that doesn't mean HTTP is secure. an ex nobody said HTTP is secure, but it's not inherently insecure, like every plain text protocol it's plain text. it's the network that is insecure, MITM is not an exclusive of HTTP. If the network is secure, HTTP is secure. In my kubernetes clusters, TLS is terminated at load balancer and PODS talk to each other using plain simple HTTP. Wasting energy on useless cryptography "just because" is not very smart IMO.
- danShumway 4y ago> They are still doing it! No, they're not! Debian uses PGP and signature verification to protect against MITM attacks because it is critically important for software downloads to be protected against MITM attacks. Now, Debian does not use HTTPS in specific to protect against MITM attacks because they have another method baked into the package managers that people are using. It does not follow that HTTP is secure, it's not. It follows that you can use an insecure protocol to deliver software if you bolt the same security features on top of it. You're looking at someone who has come up with an alternative way to protect users from MITM attacks and thus doesn't use HTTPS, and the conclusion you're drawing is, "I don't need to be concerned about MITM attacks." That's not the right lesson to draw from this. Is your publicly facing site being accessed by software that automatically checks data integrity using a set of pre-shared keys? No, and no normal person is going to manually do that check when they visit your site, so you need HTTPS. > If you are running a network where that's not possible, If your website is accessible to normal browsers on the public Internet, than you're not on a network where that's not possible. > LetsEncrypt is pretty much an advanced tool, for advanced users Most free hosts I've looked at recently from Github pages to Netlify have automatic background SSL management for free with zero configuration from the user. If you're running your own server, then you're an advanced user, but even in that situation LetsEncrypt is one of the easiest SSL setups I've ever used. Any situation where you're using a host who can't manage SSL for you is also probably a situation where you're using a host who can't manage things like DNS or hosting for you, at which point, yeah, I expect you to be able to run a command line tool. If you can install Wordpress on a server, you can use LetsEncrypt. If you can't install Wordpress on a server, you should be using a managed host, and they should install LetsEncrypt. > It's breaking confidentiality. Which is one of the features of HTTPS No, HTTPS encrypts data according to the certificate authority. While I don't like networks effectively doing MITM attacks on their own users, it is not the fault of HTTPS that it trusts the authorities that the user's device tells it to trust, any more than it's the fault of Debian if you import an untrustworthy key/repo into package manager. I was kind of leaving privacy off the table here since you were championing Debian and Debian has substantial privacy issues with software downloads. But if you want to go down that route, than sure, another weakness of HTTP is that it allows tons of network snooping that really shouldn't be possible even for "innocuous" sites that claim they don't have private data on them. > first of all, carrots and spinach are a panacea. This is a complete sidenote, but either you don't understand what "panacea" means or you're at risk of Vitamin B12 deficiency. Carrots and spinach are not cure-alls for health, no. > If the network is secure It's not. Not if it's accessible from a browser on the public Internet. > Wasting energy on useless cryptography "just because" is not very smart IMO. Rejecting basically free cryptography that substantially improves security just because people are determined to be the last holdouts on a move that pretty much every security professional recommends is cutting off one's nose to spite one's face. People being so concerned about centralization that they start sending messages in plain-text and start arguing with people online that sending messages in plain-text is somehow better for decentralization is at best misguided.