2 ms·
> That depends heavily on mechanism design though. > If I am simply aware at some stage that I have become someone's delegate and am not made aware that person
by mistermann 4y ago
> That depends heavily on mechanism design though.
> If I am simply aware at some stage that I have become someone's delegate and am not made aware that person is X, the level of secrecy means that I may rationally choose to delegate my votes to X without realising the two delegations cancel out.
Isn't the obvious solution to simply make the software enforce such situations? Or am I misunderstanding?
- notahacker 4y agoNot really in an acceptable way, no. If the software blocks me from delegating my vote to X because X has already delegated their vote to me, then ballot secrecy is violated. If the software blocks me from delegating my vote to anyone because somebody has already delegated their vote to me, any third party willing to "burn" a vote on delegating to me (to troll me, perhaps) can change my vote from my original intention to delegate it to $subjectexpert and force me to take a stance on the polic(ies) themselves or not vote, which seems like a pretty undesirable outcome even if it doesnt benefit the troll. Both measures partially violate ballot secrecy in another way (if the software doesn't block me from voting to delegate to a person, then it reveals they didn't delegate their vote to me) The only way around it is for delegates to self select [or be selected] in advance as a separate class of voters unable to delegate their own votes. This avoids this conflict and could work, but isn't the system described in the paper and will have different dynamics as a result.