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> This is unlike, say, any major US campaign of the past 30 years This seems exactly like both Iraq wars, except that Sadam's troops might have had working enc
by hedora 4y ago
> This is unlike, say, any major US campaign of the past 30 years
This seems exactly like both Iraq wars, except that Sadam's troops might have had working encrypted radios.
In the first war, massively undergunned (in terms of number of rounds of ammunition) US tanks would enter a battle, and 66% of them would immediately get stuck in a boot loop, or otherwise break down.
The remaining ones would rapidly fire a dozen rounds or so a few miles in a dozen different directions, anihilating enemy equipment well before it had any hope of striking back.
Then, logistics people would go out and fix the stranded tanks.
It's pretty obvious that the targeting systems and supply lines were what held everything together during those campaigns.
Ukraine has been dominating in those two dimensions as well (using US equipment and intelligence, in many cases).
- dredmorbius 4y agoSource on the tank boot-loop issues? First I've ever heard of that.
- wil421 4y agoNot according to a report to the Government Accountability Office about the Abrams and Bradley vehicles. However, the report does say the support and recover vehicles caused slowdowns. >During the war, the Abrams tank exhibited good reliability, lethality, sur- vivability, and mobility, but limited range, according to the observations of commanders, crews, maintenance personnel, and Army after action reports. Reported Army readiness rates for the Abrams were 90 percent or higher during the ground war-indicating a high availability to move, shoot, and communicate during combat.[1] [1]https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-92-94.pdf https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-92-94.pdf
- hedora 4y agoI heard it word of mouth from people that were there, operating or maintaining the tanks, and it was widely reported. The GAO report you linked is conspicuously missing failure rates, and doesn't contradict anything I said above. In fact, it supports my claims. Turning on 90% of the time immediately after being repaired doesn't mean its running at the end of the day, or even an hour later! From the GAO report you linked, they ran out of most types (60%) of spare parts and started cannibalizing tanks after only 4 days of operations. They had major computer issues ("communication issues" according to the report), and had to fall back on old fashioned radios and obsolete targeting. In addition to the availability issues, these problems caused the US to accidentally or intentionally destroy 1% of its own tanks during the 4 day operation (the breakdown from the report is below). The report also talks about how the recovery vehicles were unreliable and had major problems reaching broken down tanks. It makes it clear parts shortages were due to the tanks burning through a large stockpile of parts that had been shipped there before the operation began, not due to poor planning. There's no way those tanks would have survived an operation that dragged on for months like Ukraine has. However, the operation was a success despite this. I think this supports my conclusion that superior targeting and logistics won that war, not reliable, robust hardware platforms. The rest is pasted from the GAO report (I didn't correct their OCR errors): Abrams crews indicated that its range was limited because it frequently had to stop to (1) refuel to compensate for high fuel consumption and faulty fuel pumps and (2) clean air filters due to extremely sandy conditions. Bradley and Abrams crews reported problems obtaining repair parts, and many had exhausted their limited supply of some parts by the end of the loo-hour ground war. Because of these problems, according to some Army logistics personnel, sustainability could have become a major problem had the war lasted longer. Crews also experienced problems in posit,ively identifying enemy targets and in having to use outdated and unreliable radios. ... For example, logistics personnel from the 1st Cavalry Division told us that about 60 percent of the parts they were authorized had zero balances by the end of the war. To compensate for the inability of the established system to provide needed parts, combat units had to search logistics bases for needed parts, to trade with other combat units, or to take parts from other vehicles. According to some Army personnel, the inability to replenish parts reserves could have impeded sustained combat operations in a longer war. ... 23 Abrams were destroyed or damaged in the Persian Gulf area. Of the nine Abrams destroyed, seven were due to friendly fire, and two were intentionally destroyed to prevent capture after they became disabled. Similarly, of the 28 Bradleys destroyed or damaged, 20 were due to friendly fire. Moreover, weapon system capabilities were not optimized because the weapons’ ranges were greater than the sights’ ranges. Crews also noted problems with ineffective radios and suggested that a navigation system be installed in every Bradley and Abram% Army officials recognized the need for improvements in these areas (see app. III).
- sgt101 4y agoThis is 180' different from any of the scholarly well researched information about GW1 and 2 that is out there. You sir, you need to provide some references.
- hedora 4y agoResponded in sibling comment, since the other commenter provided a reference from the US GAO.
- boc 4y agoI love when I find new source material for /r/NCD in the wild.