4 ms·

Currently PRC can still hit US basing in SK or JP and trigger US art5 tier security umbrella forcing them to fight within 1st island chain and range of strong

• ericmay 4y ago
  > Currently PRC can still hit US basing in SK or JP and trigger US art5 tier security umbrella forcing them to fight within 1st island chain and range of strong PRC A2AD. But this is self-defeating for a few reasons: 1. The forces in South Korea and Japan are already there, and now you've guaranteed a war with whoever you just attacked and the US. 2. Attacking these forces doesn't result in territorial gains so now you're just lobbying missiles at countries which can lob them back. 3. An attack on South Korea or Japan will undoubtedly result in a severe backlash globally for China, regardless of whether or not they only attacked US bases (which will surely kill civilians anyway). > There's also PRC signalling developements of their prompt global strike program, using ICMBs to hit any target around the world = sinking US naval assets in port Which they won't do, because the US can't tell if these ICBMs are nuclear weapons nor where exactly they are going. So this will almost guarantee a nuclear response, which is probably not desirable for China. > Keep in mind ... First, US intelligence will see movement of Chinese forces, activation of units, missiles being prepared, etc, and then the ships can just leave port and/or move out of range. Outside of these hypersonic missiles, others can be shot down or avoided. Similarly to Russia's idiotic invasion of Ukraine, the US and allies will see Chinese activities coming well before they have any good position to attack. > Reality is short/medium term PRC rocketry developments has potential destroy not just blue water naval projection but also extends inland to other strategic targets (i.e. strategic bombers) that make entire CONUS vunerable to deter attacks on mainland PRC targets. This doesn't make sense for a few reasons. First, Chinese rockets can't destroy US blue water naval assets in the general way you are speaking. Second, the US forces in places like Guam would not just leave the strategic bombers sitting around. China could launch a surprise attack and hit targets, but that results in a response against Chinese forces, and the US can reposition forces away from these bases to locations such as Australia or Hawaii. > IMO Blockade advocates US can starve PRC with impunity without realizing CONUS has become existentially vunerable in a other domains. Third, an attack on the continental United States would probably result in a some really crazy stuff that I don't think China is interested in aggravating. > Like stop PRC food/fuel imports and don't be surprised if energy grids start breaking down or DRMed agri equipement stops functioning during harvest season. Ultimate goal is mutual conventional vunerability, which arguably already exists with cyberwarfare - US can blocade PRC, but no telling if PRC cyberwarfare can disrupt comparable % of US industrial production. Eh it can be hacked. Nothing to worry about there. Also cyber warfare really treads the line between conventional and escalatory. If China shuts down US power plants, the US will respond in kind or may further escalate. > every USN capital asset has to dock for maintainence Yes but this is usually preventive maintenance, and they don't dock at the same time. These ships dock in a rotational program so that the US maintains a consistent "coverage" based on strategic interests. That's why there are so many ships. Also since most of this maintenance tends to be retrofits and such, these ships can be redeployed quickly in an emergency. > Historically and fundementally, PRC taking TW has always been an exercise in overcoming US military. Agreed, however the US has shored up allies in the region because of China's aggressive international policies which have scared smaller countries into allying with the US. > The point when PRC chooses to take TW, it would be when PLA has eroded ability for US to intervene by which time defeating US military intervention is as significant a political victory. Current PRC military modernization and aquisitions isn't built with confronting TW in mind, but US military and assumed US intervention. Frankly if US can be deterred or defeated then taking TW would be easy simply because it opens many other options like blockade, quarantine, siege etc. Then it will be a question of whether US is foolish enough to defend TW and risk losing her global hegemony or safe face and allow it to be an domestic Chinese civil war matter. I think China really screwed up and has no chance of reunifying now. Taiwan is going to continue to buy arms and the past decade or so of being lulled to sleep by what was a peaceful Chinese rise to power was shaken by poor diplomacy, backing Russia diplomatically (though not in practice), and seizing Hong Kong. It'll just cost too many lives, which is why it won't happen. The question is whether or not China decides that it thinks the US is weak (similar to Russia's miscalculation regarding Ukraine) and how badly the war escalates. Frankly, the best path forward for all parties is probably the status quo as China can saber-rattle over Taiwan but not actually fight. A war is very difficult to control. Anything can happen. Honestly the easiest and simplest way out of this is for China to just leave Taiwan alone. But egos and such will just drag us all into a stupid war that solves nothing for anyone. I would say the easiest and simplest way is for Taiwan to just be part of China again, but if the people don't want that then it's not as easy as it is for China to leave Taiwan alone.
  • dirtyid 4y ago
    >1,2,3 IMO American hubris to assume PRC would leave US basing alone, especially in region. In event of PRC blockade (war), it's all fair game and JP/SKR much more vunerable to external dependencies and in terms of industrial base and resources, PRC sheer size can survive attrition better vs SKR and JP. Attacking these forces result in US entering first island chain, which is better than the alternative of trying to break blockade where US is strongest. Ultimate PRC stretch goal goal is to eradicate US east asian security architecture, so there's more reason to hit these bases than not. Either US comes to rescue of allies in region where they are weakest or they lose credibility. >Which they won't do More likely they will, it's spelled out in doctrine in latest PRC Science of Military Strategy. Again it's US hubris to assume only US can strike PRC mainland targets with impunity. Keep in mind US short/medium range strike platforms are all nuclear capable, but no one thinks PRC will retaliate with nukes to US tomahawks. Assured second strike exists because no one will trigger hairstring immedidate retaliation if they know adversary capable of conventional strikes. Hence PRC work on hypersonics, because realistically it's the only conventional platform that can hit CONUS, while simultaneous building up nuclear forces and maintaining No First Use to setup posture for conventional CONUS strikes. I think we're in for serious shits if US planners assume only they can strike PRC mainland and expect no retaliation. >US intelligence will see movement of Chinese forces Hypothetical PRC PGS can preempt strike with ICBMs (again doctrine for long time, though less likely) without any pre-position or visible signalling. Roll out TEL from tunnel and any target around globe can be hit within an hour. Even if discovered immediately it would take longer for ships pull out of port. Also most of US ships especially support aren't nuclear, which means they need continuous replenishment tail which are extremely vunerable. Hence point about taking out fast combat support ships (which exist in single digits) basically cripples all of USN. Escorts of CSG underway can't sail for long and become stationary single use VLS platforms assuming they can make it in theatre at all. >This doesn't make sense for a few reasons ... > attack on the continental United States It makes perfect sense for PGS use case, that's the entire rational behind PGS for US as well. There's no survivable shelter (except maybe bombers / SSNs) for strategic assets because every platform needs to stay still at some point for maintanence. Again the goal is to establish mutual conventional vunerability to deter US by making attacking mainland PRC as risky as attacking CONUS. It only doesn't make sense from US exceptionalism lens that no country in the world would dare to hit CONUS. That's historically true due to technologic limitations that prevented accurate (non nuclear) fires against Fortress America that's geographically isolated. But assumption will not hold when PRC (and eventually others) acquires accurate PGS capabilities. > don't dock at the same time No but they all dock eventually and will be therefore subject to attrition and become single use assets that can't sustain power projection. It's logical extension of PLA systems destruction warfare that targets AWACs and other critical subelements that would cripple US warfighting capability. The caveate being that PRC can bunker away enough survivable ICBMs for the weeks/months US ships can stay out at sea, and that's assuming kill chain for hitting moving ships at sea is dud. > cyber PRC will anticpate US retaliation, but functionally it enables PRC to dish proportional damage. Again, it's about mutual vunerability. The broader point being that we are in era of conventional MAD in other domains. Having a massive blue water navy isn't going to save US society from existential damage unlike in analogue era. US always had conventional capablities to hurt PRC and others with CONUS impunity, but they maybe deterred if PRC can hit US conventionally or via cyber as well. > US has shored up allies US tried/trying to, but so far there hasn't been any meaningful movement in region except words. Certainly nothing substantial like IRBMs or AGILE basing that makes US assets survivable and that's among US allies. Surprisingly no one wants to be PRC missile sinks for US. Everyone else is neutral / hedging. The crowning achievement is AUKUS that establishes new US capabilities all the way out in west AU which is farcry from initial US blob hopes of having IRBMs in every ASEAN country. Alas no taker because PRC aggressive diplomacy works. Regardless, doesn't change the fundemental changing force balance - trend is PRC will simply have more forces in theatre than US + co can hope to aggregate over time. > no chance of reunifying now Not peaceful no, but that's inevitable nature of demographic/cultural shift between different political systems. Status quo preferrable but TW/US stirring up status quo or at least reverting it to less stable arrangement (PRC is one content with 92 consensus charade). As for taking TW, if US deterred, PRC can simply turn the island into Yemen/Palestine and drag out capitulation without single boots on ground. No amount of porcupining can prevent that. I think UKR/RU and past US excursions has shown massive loss of life quickly tolerable. At end of day, it's an ongoing civil war with US playing offshore spoiler for last 70 years with no simple ending except force. It's not preferrable, but it's what's left if TW/US doesn't play ball.