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> about the safety of their fleet operating in coastal areas > i.e. the US can't reasonably sanction China. Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I assume you'r

> about the safety of their fleet operating in coastal areas > i.e. the US can't reasonably sanction China. Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I assume you're linking these ideas together. From a military standpoint, at least today, the US can use its blue water navy to patrol and shut down shipments of resources going in to China pretty well. You don't need to get near the Chinese coast to do that. The US also has no interest in any sort of land warfare in China, so ultimately the strategy is containment. That's why the US (and Biden announced this again today) would absolutely go to war with China over Taiwan, because for China to take Taiwan is to break out of this containment zone and basically eliminate most of the effectiveness of the US Navy in the Pacific as it would relate to China, and undoubtedly end the US as global hegemon. I think people assume that the US Navy has to be close to China in order to do damage and therefore naval ships are screwed because China will launch missles. While I do think the US Navy would conduct operations and quickly learn what exact capabilities the Chinese have, I don't think their effectiveness is limited to near-shore operations. Frankly, the US can shut down all maritime trade for China and now all of a sudden the Chinese are trying to ship in food and goods and energy products (oil and coal) via road, which I don't think is currently feasible. But I also don't think China is foolish enough to actually try and invade Taiwan, because that would be like Ukraine, except with the US actively fighting. Some suggest China may try and launch a limited nuclear strike on a location like Guam, but I think that's very dangerous because the US would no doubt retaliate on mainland Chinese military assets and it either ends right then and there with both sides calling a truce (and China not invading Taiwan) or it would continue to escalate into a limited nuclear exchange, which would be catastrophic. China doesn't and won't have the military strength to take over Taiwan unless it's willing to take insane losses, like Russia is now (but worse) in Ukraine. * I also have a pet conspiracy theory that the war in Iraq was launched to warm up the US military and give it practice with combined arms tactics against an enemy that can fight back, but not too hard.

paganel 4y ago
> (oil and coal) via road, which I don't think is currently feasible They'll be able to ship oil via rail and pipes from Western Siberia and the Russian Far East pretty soon, which, granted, is not as cheap as sea transport but is good enough. I think they have enough coal available inside China's borders. I still cannot understand what the US strategists think when they're throwing the Russians (and their huge mineral resources) directly into China's hands. On this Kissinger is of course right, i.e. he mentioned recently that back in the day the US was careful not to diplomatically "fight" against both China and the USSR/Russia at the same time, for good reason.
- ericmay 4y ago
  > I still cannot understand what the US strategists think when they're throwing the Russians US and NATO and the West gave Russia all the opportunity it needed to integrate and they refused. Also the resources don’t matter much. Ok so China buys them cheaply from Russia, and then the US buys them cheaply from other producers, and China keeps making products. What’s the issue?
  - paganel 4y ago
    Russia does not want to "integrate" (i.e. adopt Western "values" for the benefit of those Western countries), Putin has said that out in the open back in Munich, in 2007, I thought this global hegemonic thing that the US has had been left out somewhere in Iraq or/and Afghanistan. > and then the US buys them cheaply from other producers, and China keeps making products. What’s the issue? Afaik the US doesn't produce as much, it's China that does. In case of a future proxy war between China and the US cutting access to mineral resources might have been one of the main tactics adopted by the US. It's easier to do that when China brings in its resources via marine transport (it's a well established fact that the US dominates the planetary oceans), way harder to do that if said transport of resources is carried out "inside" a huge landmass like Eurasia.
    - ericmay 4y ago
      > Russia does not want to "integrate" (i.e. adopt Western "values" for the benefit of those Western countries), Putin has said that out in the open back in Munich, in 2007, Then I guess I'm confused about your comment: > I still cannot understand what the US strategists think when they're throwing the Russians (and their huge mineral resources) directly into China's hands. It seems you understand yea? Russia doesn't want themselves or their minerals in the hands of the West. > I thought this global hegemonic thing that the US has had been left out somewhere in Iraq or/and Afghanistan. No, it's just continued to evolve. Moving out of Afghanistan for example left a mess in the backyard of Iran, Pakistan, and China. Iraq so far has been a flawed, but growing in success endeavor. > Afaik the US doesn't produce as much, it's China that does. Sure, but that's not a lack of ability. > In case of a future proxy war between China and the US cutting access to mineral resources might have been one of the main tactics adopted by the US. It's easier to do that when China brings in its resources via marine transport (it's a well established fact that the US dominates the planetary oceans), way harder to do that if said transport of resources is carried out "inside" a huge landmass like Eurasia. I think there'd be a direct war. But I'm not sure you're disagreeing with me? The point I made was that the US Navy dominates the oceans and would block marine transport to China. In order for China to pivot into a defensive mode here it would have to spend a lot of noticeable money on infrastructure development for a future war that may or may not occur depending on its own actions. If China preemptively launched an attack and didn't build out this infrastructure, then it would be blockaded. If it did build out this infrastructure but didn't attack then it spent a lot of money for no good reason. Certainly the option is to try and build these networks in case of launching an attack, but that would happen regardless of US action.
dirtyid 4y ago
Currently PRC can still hit US basing in SK or JP and trigger US art5 tier security umbrella forcing them to fight within 1st island chain and range of strong PRC A2AD. Unless US choose to forgo commitment and obligations which is self defeating. There's also PRC signalling developements of their prompt global strike program, using ICMBs to hit any target around the world = sinking US naval assets in port. Keep in mind every USN capital asset has to dock for maintainence eventually and current fleets are sustained by less than a handful of TAEO ships that enables more than a few days of continuous operation, which will make even distant blockade unviable. Sealift command / auxiliary force has ~30 fast support/oiler/ammunition ships total for all of USN. Reality is short/medium term PRC rocketry developments has potential destroy not just blue water naval projection but also extends inland to other strategic targets (i.e. strategic bombers) that make entire CONUS vunerable to deter attacks on mainland PRC targets. Ultimate goal is mutual conventional vunerability, which arguably already exists with cyberwarfare - US can blocade PRC, but no telling if PRC cyberwarfare can disrupt comparable % of US industrial production. IMO Blockade advocates US can starve PRC with impunity without realizing CONUS has become existentially vunerable in a other domains. Like stop PRC food/fuel imports and don't be surprised if energy grids start breaking down or DRMed agri equipement stops functioning during harvest season. >except with the US actively fighting Historically and fundementally, PRC taking TW has always been an exercise in overcoming US military. The point when PRC chooses to take TW, it would be when PLA has eroded ability for US to intervene by which time defeating US military intervention is as significant a political victory. Current PRC military modernization and aquisitions isn't built with confronting TW in mind, but US military and assumed US intervention. Frankly if US can be deterred or defeated then taking TW would be easy simply because it opens many other options like blockade, quarantine, siege etc. Then it will be a question of whether US is foolish enough to defend TW and risk losing her global hegemony or safe face and allow it to be an domestic Chinese civil war matter.
- ericmay 4y ago
  > Currently PRC can still hit US basing in SK or JP and trigger US art5 tier security umbrella forcing them to fight within 1st island chain and range of strong PRC A2AD. But this is self-defeating for a few reasons: 1. The forces in South Korea and Japan are already there, and now you've guaranteed a war with whoever you just attacked and the US. 2. Attacking these forces doesn't result in territorial gains so now you're just lobbying missiles at countries which can lob them back. 3. An attack on South Korea or Japan will undoubtedly result in a severe backlash globally for China, regardless of whether or not they only attacked US bases (which will surely kill civilians anyway). > There's also PRC signalling developements of their prompt global strike program, using ICMBs to hit any target around the world = sinking US naval assets in port Which they won't do, because the US can't tell if these ICBMs are nuclear weapons nor where exactly they are going. So this will almost guarantee a nuclear response, which is probably not desirable for China. > Keep in mind ... First, US intelligence will see movement of Chinese forces, activation of units, missiles being prepared, etc, and then the ships can just leave port and/or move out of range. Outside of these hypersonic missiles, others can be shot down or avoided. Similarly to Russia's idiotic invasion of Ukraine, the US and allies will see Chinese activities coming well before they have any good position to attack. > Reality is short/medium term PRC rocketry developments has potential destroy not just blue water naval projection but also extends inland to other strategic targets (i.e. strategic bombers) that make entire CONUS vunerable to deter attacks on mainland PRC targets. This doesn't make sense for a few reasons. First, Chinese rockets can't destroy US blue water naval assets in the general way you are speaking. Second, the US forces in places like Guam would not just leave the strategic bombers sitting around. China could launch a surprise attack and hit targets, but that results in a response against Chinese forces, and the US can reposition forces away from these bases to locations such as Australia or Hawaii. > IMO Blockade advocates US can starve PRC with impunity without realizing CONUS has become existentially vunerable in a other domains. Third, an attack on the continental United States would probably result in a some really crazy stuff that I don't think China is interested in aggravating. > Like stop PRC food/fuel imports and don't be surprised if energy grids start breaking down or DRMed agri equipement stops functioning during harvest season. Ultimate goal is mutual conventional vunerability, which arguably already exists with cyberwarfare - US can blocade PRC, but no telling if PRC cyberwarfare can disrupt comparable % of US industrial production. Eh it can be hacked. Nothing to worry about there. Also cyber warfare really treads the line between conventional and escalatory. If China shuts down US power plants, the US will respond in kind or may further escalate. > every USN capital asset has to dock for maintainence Yes but this is usually preventive maintenance, and they don't dock at the same time. These ships dock in a rotational program so that the US maintains a consistent "coverage" based on strategic interests. That's why there are so many ships. Also since most of this maintenance tends to be retrofits and such, these ships can be redeployed quickly in an emergency. > Historically and fundementally, PRC taking TW has always been an exercise in overcoming US military. Agreed, however the US has shored up allies in the region because of China's aggressive international policies which have scared smaller countries into allying with the US. > The point when PRC chooses to take TW, it would be when PLA has eroded ability for US to intervene by which time defeating US military intervention is as significant a political victory. Current PRC military modernization and aquisitions isn't built with confronting TW in mind, but US military and assumed US intervention. Frankly if US can be deterred or defeated then taking TW would be easy simply because it opens many other options like blockade, quarantine, siege etc. Then it will be a question of whether US is foolish enough to defend TW and risk losing her global hegemony or safe face and allow it to be an domestic Chinese civil war matter. I think China really screwed up and has no chance of reunifying now. Taiwan is going to continue to buy arms and the past decade or so of being lulled to sleep by what was a peaceful Chinese rise to power was shaken by poor diplomacy, backing Russia diplomatically (though not in practice), and seizing Hong Kong. It'll just cost too many lives, which is why it won't happen. The question is whether or not China decides that it thinks the US is weak (similar to Russia's miscalculation regarding Ukraine) and how badly the war escalates. Frankly, the best path forward for all parties is probably the status quo as China can saber-rattle over Taiwan but not actually fight. A war is very difficult to control. Anything can happen. Honestly the easiest and simplest way out of this is for China to just leave Taiwan alone. But egos and such will just drag us all into a stupid war that solves nothing for anyone. I would say the easiest and simplest way is for Taiwan to just be part of China again, but if the people don't want that then it's not as easy as it is for China to leave Taiwan alone.
XorNot 4y ago
You've sort of missed my point here: the point isn't a direct military engagement with China, and the Millenium challenge war game wasn't about a direct engagement with a major power - it was about an invasion of a regional state like Iran. So the whole issue is that the US getting embroiled in a fight with someone for reasons has the issue that they're unlikely to be in a full-scale war footing, but rather they'll be fighting a single state with lots of neighboring friendlies, civilian traffic, and since they're not directly fighting China, no one's going to be able to stop the Chinese if they choose to screw around from backing whoever the opponent is. Basically: exactly the scenario Russia finds themselves in with Ukraine.
sudosysgen 4y ago
Unlike the Ukrainians, the Chinese antiship missiles have very long legs. As in, 5000km+. They are 30 years apart technologically, if not more. In theory, the DF-ZF could hit a target 10,000km away, but I don't think that's operational yet. The best bet for the USN to blockade would be with submarines. A blockade with surface vessels is going to be exceedingly difficult. Also, China has enough oil stockpiles (around a year) to be able to switch their oil to overland transportation, not via roads but via pipes. Meanwhile, coal wouldn't be transported by ship but by rail, which is expensive but not that bad.
- chipsa 4y ago
  A problem with very long range ASMs is targeting: how do you make sure the target is still within the field of view of your seeker when the missile gets to the target area, and how do you make sure it's actually the target? This is a major reason why TASM was retired.
  - sudosysgen 4y ago
    It's not very complicated. The target is very large and slow, while the missile is very fast. I've done the math a few years ago, but with consumer-level optics you could easily search a 40km diameter area for a 300m sized optics in seconds from a distance of 300km. Beyond that, you can use datalinks with a satellite (carriers are visible all the way from geostationary orbit), as well as two different types of targeting sensors on the missile, presumably optics+radar (which the Chinese seem to be doing), and obtain a very robust targeting solution. The TASM was retired because it's really just a worse Harpoon in everything except payload. It wasn't worth putting too much work into it. It's also 10x slower than a DF-26, and speed helps a lot with targeting. Also, the TASM was pretty easy to shoot down since it was big, slow, and not very maneuvrable.

paganel 4y ago

> (oil and coal) via road, which I don't think is currently feasible They'll be able to ship oil via rail and pipes from Western Siberia and the Russian Far East pretty soon, which, granted, is not as cheap as sea transport but is good enough. I think they have enough coal available inside China's borders. I still cannot understand what the US strategists think when they're throwing the Russians (and their huge mineral resources) directly into China's hands. On this Kissinger is of course right, i.e. he mentioned recently that back in the day the US was careful not to diplomatically "fight" against both China and the USSR/Russia at the same time, for good reason.

ericmay 4y ago
> I still cannot understand what the US strategists think when they're throwing the Russians US and NATO and the West gave Russia all the opportunity it needed to integrate and they refused. Also the resources don’t matter much. Ok so China buys them cheaply from Russia, and then the US buys them cheaply from other producers, and China keeps making products. What’s the issue?
- paganel 4y ago
  Russia does not want to "integrate" (i.e. adopt Western "values" for the benefit of those Western countries), Putin has said that out in the open back in Munich, in 2007, I thought this global hegemonic thing that the US has had been left out somewhere in Iraq or/and Afghanistan. > and then the US buys them cheaply from other producers, and China keeps making products. What’s the issue? Afaik the US doesn't produce as much, it's China that does. In case of a future proxy war between China and the US cutting access to mineral resources might have been one of the main tactics adopted by the US. It's easier to do that when China brings in its resources via marine transport (it's a well established fact that the US dominates the planetary oceans), way harder to do that if said transport of resources is carried out "inside" a huge landmass like Eurasia.
  - ericmay 4y ago
    > Russia does not want to "integrate" (i.e. adopt Western "values" for the benefit of those Western countries), Putin has said that out in the open back in Munich, in 2007, Then I guess I'm confused about your comment: > I still cannot understand what the US strategists think when they're throwing the Russians (and their huge mineral resources) directly into China's hands. It seems you understand yea? Russia doesn't want themselves or their minerals in the hands of the West. > I thought this global hegemonic thing that the US has had been left out somewhere in Iraq or/and Afghanistan. No, it's just continued to evolve. Moving out of Afghanistan for example left a mess in the backyard of Iran, Pakistan, and China. Iraq so far has been a flawed, but growing in success endeavor. > Afaik the US doesn't produce as much, it's China that does. Sure, but that's not a lack of ability. > In case of a future proxy war between China and the US cutting access to mineral resources might have been one of the main tactics adopted by the US. It's easier to do that when China brings in its resources via marine transport (it's a well established fact that the US dominates the planetary oceans), way harder to do that if said transport of resources is carried out "inside" a huge landmass like Eurasia. I think there'd be a direct war. But I'm not sure you're disagreeing with me? The point I made was that the US Navy dominates the oceans and would block marine transport to China. In order for China to pivot into a defensive mode here it would have to spend a lot of noticeable money on infrastructure development for a future war that may or may not occur depending on its own actions. If China preemptively launched an attack and didn't build out this infrastructure, then it would be blockaded. If it did build out this infrastructure but didn't attack then it spent a lot of money for no good reason. Certainly the option is to try and build these networks in case of launching an attack, but that would happen regardless of US action.

dirtyid 4y ago

Currently PRC can still hit US basing in SK or JP and trigger US art5 tier security umbrella forcing them to fight within 1st island chain and range of strong PRC A2AD. Unless US choose to forgo commitment and obligations which is self defeating. There's also PRC signalling developements of their prompt global strike program, using ICMBs to hit any target around the world = sinking US naval assets in port. Keep in mind every USN capital asset has to dock for maintainence eventually and current fleets are sustained by less than a handful of TAEO ships that enables more than a few days of continuous operation, which will make even distant blockade unviable. Sealift command / auxiliary force has ~30 fast support/oiler/ammunition ships total for all of USN. Reality is short/medium term PRC rocketry developments has potential destroy not just blue water naval projection but also extends inland to other strategic targets (i.e. strategic bombers) that make entire CONUS vunerable to deter attacks on mainland PRC targets. Ultimate goal is mutual conventional vunerability, which arguably already exists with cyberwarfare - US can blocade PRC, but no telling if PRC cyberwarfare can disrupt comparable % of US industrial production. IMO Blockade advocates US can starve PRC with impunity without realizing CONUS has become existentially vunerable in a other domains. Like stop PRC food/fuel imports and don't be surprised if energy grids start breaking down or DRMed agri equipement stops functioning during harvest season. >except with the US actively fighting Historically and fundementally, PRC taking TW has always been an exercise in overcoming US military. The point when PRC chooses to take TW, it would be when PLA has eroded ability for US to intervene by which time defeating US military intervention is as significant a political victory. Current PRC military modernization and aquisitions isn't built with confronting TW in mind, but US military and assumed US intervention. Frankly if US can be deterred or defeated then taking TW would be easy simply because it opens many other options like blockade, quarantine, siege etc. Then it will be a question of whether US is foolish enough to defend TW and risk losing her global hegemony or safe face and allow it to be an domestic Chinese civil war matter.

ericmay 4y ago
> Currently PRC can still hit US basing in SK or JP and trigger US art5 tier security umbrella forcing them to fight within 1st island chain and range of strong PRC A2AD. But this is self-defeating for a few reasons: 1. The forces in South Korea and Japan are already there, and now you've guaranteed a war with whoever you just attacked and the US. 2. Attacking these forces doesn't result in territorial gains so now you're just lobbying missiles at countries which can lob them back. 3. An attack on South Korea or Japan will undoubtedly result in a severe backlash globally for China, regardless of whether or not they only attacked US bases (which will surely kill civilians anyway). > There's also PRC signalling developements of their prompt global strike program, using ICMBs to hit any target around the world = sinking US naval assets in port Which they won't do, because the US can't tell if these ICBMs are nuclear weapons nor where exactly they are going. So this will almost guarantee a nuclear response, which is probably not desirable for China. > Keep in mind ... First, US intelligence will see movement of Chinese forces, activation of units, missiles being prepared, etc, and then the ships can just leave port and/or move out of range. Outside of these hypersonic missiles, others can be shot down or avoided. Similarly to Russia's idiotic invasion of Ukraine, the US and allies will see Chinese activities coming well before they have any good position to attack. > Reality is short/medium term PRC rocketry developments has potential destroy not just blue water naval projection but also extends inland to other strategic targets (i.e. strategic bombers) that make entire CONUS vunerable to deter attacks on mainland PRC targets. This doesn't make sense for a few reasons. First, Chinese rockets can't destroy US blue water naval assets in the general way you are speaking. Second, the US forces in places like Guam would not just leave the strategic bombers sitting around. China could launch a surprise attack and hit targets, but that results in a response against Chinese forces, and the US can reposition forces away from these bases to locations such as Australia or Hawaii. > IMO Blockade advocates US can starve PRC with impunity without realizing CONUS has become existentially vunerable in a other domains. Third, an attack on the continental United States would probably result in a some really crazy stuff that I don't think China is interested in aggravating. > Like stop PRC food/fuel imports and don't be surprised if energy grids start breaking down or DRMed agri equipement stops functioning during harvest season. Ultimate goal is mutual conventional vunerability, which arguably already exists with cyberwarfare - US can blocade PRC, but no telling if PRC cyberwarfare can disrupt comparable % of US industrial production. Eh it can be hacked. Nothing to worry about there. Also cyber warfare really treads the line between conventional and escalatory. If China shuts down US power plants, the US will respond in kind or may further escalate. > every USN capital asset has to dock for maintainence Yes but this is usually preventive maintenance, and they don't dock at the same time. These ships dock in a rotational program so that the US maintains a consistent "coverage" based on strategic interests. That's why there are so many ships. Also since most of this maintenance tends to be retrofits and such, these ships can be redeployed quickly in an emergency. > Historically and fundementally, PRC taking TW has always been an exercise in overcoming US military. Agreed, however the US has shored up allies in the region because of China's aggressive international policies which have scared smaller countries into allying with the US. > The point when PRC chooses to take TW, it would be when PLA has eroded ability for US to intervene by which time defeating US military intervention is as significant a political victory. Current PRC military modernization and aquisitions isn't built with confronting TW in mind, but US military and assumed US intervention. Frankly if US can be deterred or defeated then taking TW would be easy simply because it opens many other options like blockade, quarantine, siege etc. Then it will be a question of whether US is foolish enough to defend TW and risk losing her global hegemony or safe face and allow it to be an domestic Chinese civil war matter. I think China really screwed up and has no chance of reunifying now. Taiwan is going to continue to buy arms and the past decade or so of being lulled to sleep by what was a peaceful Chinese rise to power was shaken by poor diplomacy, backing Russia diplomatically (though not in practice), and seizing Hong Kong. It'll just cost too many lives, which is why it won't happen. The question is whether or not China decides that it thinks the US is weak (similar to Russia's miscalculation regarding Ukraine) and how badly the war escalates. Frankly, the best path forward for all parties is probably the status quo as China can saber-rattle over Taiwan but not actually fight. A war is very difficult to control. Anything can happen. Honestly the easiest and simplest way out of this is for China to just leave Taiwan alone. But egos and such will just drag us all into a stupid war that solves nothing for anyone. I would say the easiest and simplest way is for Taiwan to just be part of China again, but if the people don't want that then it's not as easy as it is for China to leave Taiwan alone.

XorNot 4y ago

You've sort of missed my point here: the point isn't a direct military engagement with China, and the Millenium challenge war game wasn't about a direct engagement with a major power - it was about an invasion of a regional state like Iran. So the whole issue is that the US getting embroiled in a fight with someone for reasons has the issue that they're unlikely to be in a full-scale war footing, but rather they'll be fighting a single state with lots of neighboring friendlies, civilian traffic, and since they're not directly fighting China, no one's going to be able to stop the Chinese if they choose to screw around from backing whoever the opponent is. Basically: exactly the scenario Russia finds themselves in with Ukraine.

sudosysgen 4y ago

Unlike the Ukrainians, the Chinese antiship missiles have very long legs. As in, 5000km+. They are 30 years apart technologically, if not more. In theory, the DF-ZF could hit a target 10,000km away, but I don't think that's operational yet. The best bet for the USN to blockade would be with submarines. A blockade with surface vessels is going to be exceedingly difficult. Also, China has enough oil stockpiles (around a year) to be able to switch their oil to overland transportation, not via roads but via pipes. Meanwhile, coal wouldn't be transported by ship but by rail, which is expensive but not that bad.

chipsa 4y ago
A problem with very long range ASMs is targeting: how do you make sure the target is still within the field of view of your seeker when the missile gets to the target area, and how do you make sure it's actually the target? This is a major reason why TASM was retired.
- sudosysgen 4y ago
  It's not very complicated. The target is very large and slow, while the missile is very fast. I've done the math a few years ago, but with consumer-level optics you could easily search a 40km diameter area for a 300m sized optics in seconds from a distance of 300km. Beyond that, you can use datalinks with a satellite (carriers are visible all the way from geostationary orbit), as well as two different types of targeting sensors on the missile, presumably optics+radar (which the Chinese seem to be doing), and obtain a very robust targeting solution. The TASM was retired because it's really just a worse Harpoon in everything except payload. It wasn't worth putting too much work into it. It's also 10x slower than a DF-26, and speed helps a lot with targeting. Also, the TASM was pretty easy to shoot down since it was big, slow, and not very maneuvrable.