> So none of the empirical facts are under dispute. The > question then is a purely philosophical one: is there a > sensible notion of free will given det

> So none of the empirical facts are under dispute. The > question then is a purely philosophical one: is there a > sensible notion of free will given determinism? Should > (normative claim!) we treat people like they have free > will, i.e. punish/reward them for their actions? Thanks for your reply jessriedel. In my opinion the two outcomes that make sense here are to declare that free will makes no sense to apply to any entities at all, or to apply it to literally all entities in the universe. I'm not sure which is more palatable. Regarding the normative / moral / legal issues, I don't think rejecting non-causal free will necessarily has any immediate implications. Patricia Churchland's writings on this topic very persuasive to me.