I believe that if you are sufficiently high on an international watch list E2E is mostly useless. The way the Russian invasion of Ukraine was so accurately tele

I believe that if you are sufficiently high on an international watch list E2E is mostly useless. The way the Russian invasion of Ukraine was so accurately telegraphed by the US was a demonstration to me of how powerful our intelligence apparatus is. As far as I'm concerned every cellular device is probably backdoored through the baseband, telecoms have long worked hand in hand with the USG, and the pressure that the US has put on allies to boycott Huwei RF hardware only strengthened that claim. If you are, say, a head of ISIS, my guess is that your phone already has keyloggers on it. This whole conversation is a microcosm of US politics in that both sides are completely unwilling to compromise on their position. Nothing is saying that you couldn't roll a "right to privacy" into legislation, say that anyone who provides a messaging system isn't allowed to analyze those messages, and any read/write action has to be instigated by or in service to either the user or a warrant. Add massive fines as a percent of revenue or significant prison time for violations. Wouldn't that be a win/win? You could then treat E2E encryption like other military assets, civilians need to register and pass a background check. If you have a driver's license in the US you sign away your right to not take a drug test, similarly you could sign away your right not to tell law enforcement your password. Corporations could make being licensed for E2E a hiring bar just like military clearance. All this is dependent on my (some might say naive) view that the US is ultimately a democracy(and has a strong history of it) and as a result is unlikely to go fully off the rails. I really don't worry about the USG snooping on me, (why would I? seriously) but I literally just last week heard about the young daughter of an acquaintance of an acquaintance getting kidnapped.