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Ya know what, good. It sucks that dev tools caught in the crossfire here but anything to put another nail in the broken corporate mitm "security" appliances is
by Spivak 5y ago
Ya know what, good. It sucks that dev tools caught in the crossfire here but anything to put another nail in the broken corporate mitm "security" appliances is a huge win. Along with encrypted DNS we might actually reach nirvana of "either give me a clean connection to the public internet or don't but no stupid half broken middle."
- unethical_ban 5y agoAs a network security person, if you can't MitM, then monitoring and filtering will simply move to the endpoint. Monitoring is an absolute necessity and positive thing on certain networks.
- Spivak 5y agoYou're describing the world everyone wants. I would much rather OS's move to a system with a filtering API so I can get real errors like "connection not allowed by local security policy" instead of pretending like it works and then dropping packets or getting garbage responses from the appliance pretending to be my server.
- dane-pgp 5y agoOf course what we'll actually get is networks which require[0] your OS to attest that you are running in Secure Boot mode, so the network can ensure you are running an "approved" OS that prevents you from running VPNs or Tor or bittorrent or E2EE messengers... [0] https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2021/09/riot-games-anti-cheat-software-will-require-tpm-secure-boot-on-windows-11/ https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2021/09/riot-games-anti-cheat...
- unethical_ban 5y agoHey, I hear you. That just means I'll have to get good at a different UI!
- xg15 5y agoOk, but filter on what criteria? If the connection is encrypted, how do you know what you should filter for?
- unethical_ban 5y agothe idea is that device traffic would be inspected by the OS via some subsystem that encrypts/decrypts application traffic. I'm talking out of my butt here, I am not an OS person or a dev. I imagine instead of the web browser encrypting traffic before sending it on the wire, it would send it in the clear to a process on the OS ("Endec"? I'm trying to think of some word like codec or modem for encrypt/decrypt). This process would be the hub for all endpoint encrypt-decrypt operations, and the place where all apps would trust to do the work. That way, inspection tools desired by the user (or in corp land, the admin) could hook in and do filtering. Applications that don't want this, such as say, Signal or other hyper-privacy tools, could choose their own trust store and bypass it, if permitted by the OS admin. Otherwise, corps could block raw access to the NIC.
- nybble41 5y ago> then monitoring and filtering will simply move to the endpoint Good. That's where it belongs.
- vetinari 5y agoExcept for endpoints where the user/owner has zero control. Think your smart TV or Chromecast. Suddenly, they can do anything they want and you cannot stop them.
- nybble41 5y agoDevices you can't control are also a problem, but the endpoints are still the right places to implement filtering. You can't guarantee access to the data anyway, as they can always encrypt the content independently of TLS. Though they're more likely to pin their own certificates so they can't be MitM'd and simply refuse to operate in a network environment hostile to end-to-end encryption. It's best to just wall untrusted devices off from the rest of the network so they can access the Internet as required to do their job but not interact with any of your other devices. Or alternatively, replace them with open-source devices you do control.
- Avamander 5y agoWe might even be able to use SCTP or TCP Fast Open in the real world once those boxes start becoming obsolete.
- feanaro 5y agoDo you know what other thing you've just put into a nailed coffin? The ability to inspect traffic your own device is making. So now Google and other nasty corporations get to decide what they send back to their servers without a possibility of you ever finding out. Be careful what you wish for.
- Spivak 5y agoBut this was already possible, hitching your “I have control over my own device” wagon to “My device allows me to x, y, or z” that are only possible due to history, backwards compatibility, or because not enough people actually do it to be a problem is a battle already lost. Winning the war requires legislation that demands devices and software be introspectable by all users, not just ones that can set up cheeky mitm proxies.
- feanaro 5y agoBut they're not cheeky MITM proxies, it's the way HTTP traffic inspection is done. Even if the right to inspect your traffic was legislated, it would need to be compatible with existing MITM tooling. Why am I suddenly getting the "just go get some legislation" treatment? I could just as well give you a lesson about how trying to prevent corporate MITM middleboxes with technological means is a lost cause and you should just work on getting some legislation to prevent it.
- Spivak 5y agoThe difference, to me, is that eliminating the ability for someone who isn't the operator of a website to present a valid cert for that website is an improvement for security and reliability. > it would need to be compatible with existing MITM tooling In my ideal world it wouldn't be, it would be done on the endpoint before/after the traffic is encrypted/decrypted. There would be no need to mitm anything, the OS would happily show you the content and be legally required to provide facilities for the user/software to do so. Regulating away mitm proxies doesn't make sense because we don't need to do it, you can prevent middleboxes with nothing other than tech by breaking the ability to mitm connections.
- xg15 5y ago"either give me a clean connection to the public internet or don't but no stupid half broken middle." Except the "me" in that sentence isn't you, it's whatever apps you have installed. But what alternative would you propose?