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> Eric Friedman’s new book Reinventing Philanthropy: A Framework for More Effective Giving presents a similar take. In the book, Friedman goes even further than
by b450 4y ago
> Eric Friedman’s new book Reinventing Philanthropy: A Framework for More Effective Giving presents a similar take. In the book, Friedman goes even further than Singer by contrasting the work of St. Jude Children’s Research Hospitals with Malaje Provincial Hospital in Angola. After contrasting two patients served at the different hospitals for life-threatening medical conditions, he concludes, “I’d probably also be very angry at the donors who are continuously funding St. Jude and leaving Malanje Provincial woefully under-resourced. Why are [the patients of St. Jude] so much more worthy of life…?” This seems to us an absurd contrast and presumes a callousness by St. Jude donors that bears no resemblance to reality. Of course it is worthwhile to support both institutions if they both provide life-saving results; but Friedman and others indicate that one should support Malanje and not St. Jude as the “best” choice, and support that claim with nothing other than a decidedly skewed morality.
Not OP, but this passage is representative. The authors' claims here are:
(a) the contrast between patients at Malanje Provincial and St Jude is "absurd". The authors don't explain what in particular is absurd about it. This is basically the style of argument employed in the article, which mostly amounts to "EA is self-evidently wrong" without elaboration.
(b) Friedman presumes that St. Jude donors are "callous". This is clearly unfounded, since the quoted passage is consistent with the idea that St. Jude donors are (say) well-intentioned but culpably ignorant. This is another thread in the authors' arguments - roughly, "EA takes issues with X; X is obviously good; therefore EA is wrong". This is a generic argument that could be employed against any position that isn't a bland endorsement of totally conventional morality, and is another version of "EA is just wrong".
(c) Friedman supports his claim with "nothing other than a decidedly skewed morality." This is overtly false, since Friedman's argument is almost certainly defended via some sort of EA premise, like, "saving more lives/alleviating more suffering (per dollar donated) is better than fewer/less." Not an unassailable argument by any means, but the author's don't assail the argument so much as deny that it exists at all, except as a morality that they flatly assert is "skewed".