3 ms·
> booting an old computer with no wifi capabilities and no hard disk from a Linux Live CD. By doing that, you are increasing your trusted code base by several
by lxgr 5y ago
> booting an old computer with no wifi capabilities and no hard disk from a Linux Live CD.
By doing that, you are increasing your trusted code base by several orders of magnitudes doing that. This might be fine for your purposes, but in a corporate environment, it might very much not be.
> Then I only need to trust the specs, not the HSM vendor.
You do trust the HSM (vendor) no matter how you use it. Ironically, the more modern a cryptographic protocol is, the more opportunity for surreptitious key exfiltration there is. This could be in the form of predictable (using a shared secret) initialization vectors, wrapped keys and much more.
You also trust an HSM to be more tamper-resistant and/or more hardened against logical attacks than a regular computer, or there would not really be a point in using one in the first place.