4 ms·

> I think the whole point of HSMs is that you can’t back up (read: exfiltrate) the master secrets. You're getting it backwards though. You are right that the

> I think the whole point of HSMs is that you can’t back up (read: exfiltrate) the master secrets. You're getting it backwards though. You are right that the whole point of an HSM is to not leak secrets when connected to a compromised computer. However there's nothing wrong with a HSM device that can be initialized with a "seed" of your liking, as long as that initialization step is done in a fully offline / airgapped way. Ledger (whose CEO was, before creating Ledger), one of the member of the team working on the FIDO specs, make a "hardware wallet" for cryptocurrencies that can run a FIDO app. And it's totally possible to initialize the seed of your liking for your U2F device. Now I did test this a while ago (out of curiosity) and it all working but I'm not really using it atm: I don't know where it's at regarding the latest FIDO2 specs. But the point is: what GP asked for can totally be done. I understand some may want to move the goalpost and say: "ok but then the problem now is not losing your piece of paper where you wrote that seed". But that is another topic altogether that does change nothing to the fact that you can have an HSM used for U2F that can be backed up.

_vdpp 4y ago
How is that seed any different from a password then?
- Kab1r 4y ago
  For one, it's only ever seen once: during initialization.
  - jjeaff 4y ago
    In addition, I believe it is not stored on the device. So it can't be exhilarated.
    - rodgerd 4y ago
      I, too, find devices prevent exhilaration these days. Seriously, though, paper is better for most people that managing device cloning or the like. Most people can have a notebook in their house as a backup-of-last resort. Asking folks to become HSM managers seems unlikely to lead to better outcomes.
- lrvick 4y ago
  It never comes into contact with the memory of a network connected system, therefore putting it beyond the reach of phishing or malware thus solving the overwhelming majority of risks actual passwords are exposed to.
3np 4y ago
> Ledger (whose CEO was, before creating Ledger) You mean their CTO aka btchip, right? Current CEO is non-techie and was not directly part of founding team.

_vdpp 4y ago

How is that seed any different from a password then?

Kab1r 4y ago
For one, it's only ever seen once: during initialization.
- jjeaff 4y ago
  In addition, I believe it is not stored on the device. So it can't be exhilarated.
  - rodgerd 4y ago
    I, too, find devices prevent exhilaration these days. Seriously, though, paper is better for most people that managing device cloning or the like. Most people can have a notebook in their house as a backup-of-last resort. Asking folks to become HSM managers seems unlikely to lead to better outcomes.
lrvick 4y ago
It never comes into contact with the memory of a network connected system, therefore putting it beyond the reach of phishing or malware thus solving the overwhelming majority of risks actual passwords are exposed to.

3np 4y ago

> Ledger (whose CEO was, before creating Ledger) You mean their CTO aka btchip, right? Current CEO is non-techie and was not directly part of founding team.