3 ms·

The recovery key is different because it's "locked in a safe" and used rarely, if ever, instead of being used constantly.

skrebbel 5y ago
But.. is passwords being used a common way for them to leak? I've never heard of this before but I'm no expert. Isn't the threat model either company databases being (badly hashed and) leaked, or password managers being hacked wholesale? I mean where am I supposed to store the recovery key if not in my password manager? My dropbox surely isn't better encrypted than my bitwarden. I work with the assumption that my password manager is the least insecure piece of data storage I use. I really don't get it. How isn't 2FA just security theater if we're all supposed to store the recovery keys "somewhere safe"? Can we really expect people to deal with recovery keys in a more responsible way than they do with passwords?
- Arnavion 5y ago
  >I mean where am I supposed to store the recovery key if not in my password manager? My password manager (keepassxc) supports multiple databases. I store all TOTP recovery codes in a separate database (and with a different unlocking password) from the one that has regular passwords and the TOTP secrets. All my databases are backed up on someone-else's-computer, but I only keep the regular-passwords-and-TOTP-secrets database synced to my devices.
- nighthawk454 5y ago
  I think "ideally" you print out the codes and physically secure them somewhere, so the risk isn't high. Recovery codes aren't about safety from being hacked, they're about mitigating the risk of you losing your 2FA code device. In practice, 2FA is just another password anyway. What it really helps with is password reuse.
- LarryDarrell 5y ago
  The best-case ordinary person is going to store them in "<user name>/My Documents/Security Keys/keys.txt". The average-case person is going to ignore the generated keys because they are deluged with nonsense every day and can't filter out what is important anymore. Lots of people will get locked out of accounts before they learn that there is now yet another unwanted tech bureaucratic layer to take seriously. I'm guessing in 5 years it will be normal to set up security questions for 2fa recovery keys. Or we'll add another 2fa for 2fa key recovery. The adding of layers will continue until we are all "secure" and we'll all have to ask for our misplaced keys from the NSA.
a9h74j 5y ago
But what about on the server side? We generally know about passwords being salted and hashed. How are these recovery keys stored, regenerated etc? (I suppose they are also salted and hashed, but they are shorter and potentially easier to crack than good passwords, given a breach, no? Or just one longer, tougher recoveryKeyGenKey need be salted and hashed.)

skrebbel 5y ago

But.. is passwords being used a common way for them to leak? I've never heard of this before but I'm no expert. Isn't the threat model either company databases being (badly hashed and) leaked, or password managers being hacked wholesale? I mean where am I supposed to store the recovery key if not in my password manager? My dropbox surely isn't better encrypted than my bitwarden. I work with the assumption that my password manager is the least insecure piece of data storage I use. I really don't get it. How isn't 2FA just security theater if we're all supposed to store the recovery keys "somewhere safe"? Can we really expect people to deal with recovery keys in a more responsible way than they do with passwords?

Arnavion 5y ago
>I mean where am I supposed to store the recovery key if not in my password manager? My password manager (keepassxc) supports multiple databases. I store all TOTP recovery codes in a separate database (and with a different unlocking password) from the one that has regular passwords and the TOTP secrets. All my databases are backed up on someone-else's-computer, but I only keep the regular-passwords-and-TOTP-secrets database synced to my devices.
nighthawk454 5y ago
I think "ideally" you print out the codes and physically secure them somewhere, so the risk isn't high. Recovery codes aren't about safety from being hacked, they're about mitigating the risk of you losing your 2FA code device. In practice, 2FA is just another password anyway. What it really helps with is password reuse.
LarryDarrell 5y ago
The best-case ordinary person is going to store them in "<user name>/My Documents/Security Keys/keys.txt". The average-case person is going to ignore the generated keys because they are deluged with nonsense every day and can't filter out what is important anymore. Lots of people will get locked out of accounts before they learn that there is now yet another unwanted tech bureaucratic layer to take seriously. I'm guessing in 5 years it will be normal to set up security questions for 2fa recovery keys. Or we'll add another 2fa for 2fa key recovery. The adding of layers will continue until we are all "secure" and we'll all have to ask for our misplaced keys from the NSA.

a9h74j 5y ago

But what about on the server side? We generally know about passwords being salted and hashed. How are these recovery keys stored, regenerated etc? (I suppose they are also salted and hashed, but they are shorter and potentially easier to crack than good passwords, given a breach, no? Or just one longer, tougher recoveryKeyGenKey need be salted and hashed.)