4 ms·

> Beliefs founded in faith cannot be argued or proven. Is there a continuum here? E.g., with statistics?

dredmorbius 4y ago
I'm not following. If you're referring to mathematics, much of it is based on axioms, which are presumed true. There's also the problem of Goedel's Theorem. Statistics introduces the distinction of causal knowledge and inferrence. Unless you're referring to something else.
- memling 4y ago
  > Unless you're referring to something else. Perhaps. Statistics seems like a way for us to quantify uncertainty under certain assumptions. We can formalize this, but I'm not sure that's helpful for me to help articulate my thoughts in the matter. The Skeptic's Dictionary has a fairly lengthy definition of faith that I suppose is a suitable working definition for maybe making the question more clear: >Faith is a non-rational belief in some proposition. A non-rational belief is one that is contrary to the sum of the evidence for that belief. A belief is contrary to the sum of the evidence if there is overwhelming evidence against the belief, e.g., that the earth is flat, hollow, or is the center of the universe. A belief is also contrary to the sum of the evidence if the evidence seems equal both for and against the belief, yet one commits to one of the two or more equally supported propositions. I'm not sure how far we can take this, but there appear to be some shades of meaning in which: 1. Faith is a wrong belief. (The earth is flat, nothing you say can convince me otherwise.) 2. Faith is a wrongly-held belief. (I should be agnostic about which face is visible in my next coin flip, but I believe it will be heads in my heart of hearts.) It's this second point that brings out more of my question, which I suppose could be phrased, "At what point is a belief warranted?" I've seen some arguments for example that physicists require five sigma to announce a discovery (or is it six?). Is that the point at which we say that faith is no longer faith? Really the specific limit isn't of particular interest to me, but more understanding what constitutes reasonable belief in general and how far one can take skepticism before it sinks under its own weight.

I'm not following. If you're referring to mathematics, much of it is based on axioms, which are presumed true. There's also the problem of Goedel's Theorem. Statistics introduces the distinction of causal knowledge and inferrence. Unless you're referring to something else.

memling 4y ago
> Unless you're referring to something else. Perhaps. Statistics seems like a way for us to quantify uncertainty under certain assumptions. We can formalize this, but I'm not sure that's helpful for me to help articulate my thoughts in the matter. The Skeptic's Dictionary has a fairly lengthy definition of faith that I suppose is a suitable working definition for maybe making the question more clear: >Faith is a non-rational belief in some proposition. A non-rational belief is one that is contrary to the sum of the evidence for that belief. A belief is contrary to the sum of the evidence if there is overwhelming evidence against the belief, e.g., that the earth is flat, hollow, or is the center of the universe. A belief is also contrary to the sum of the evidence if the evidence seems equal both for and against the belief, yet one commits to one of the two or more equally supported propositions. I'm not sure how far we can take this, but there appear to be some shades of meaning in which: 1. Faith is a wrong belief. (The earth is flat, nothing you say can convince me otherwise.) 2. Faith is a wrongly-held belief. (I should be agnostic about which face is visible in my next coin flip, but I believe it will be heads in my heart of hearts.) It's this second point that brings out more of my question, which I suppose could be phrased, "At what point is a belief warranted?" I've seen some arguments for example that physicists require five sigma to announce a discovery (or is it six?). Is that the point at which we say that faith is no longer faith? Really the specific limit isn't of particular interest to me, but more understanding what constitutes reasonable belief in general and how far one can take skepticism before it sinks under its own weight.