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> Lets say you've got a 'fob' which is plugged into a USB port I still fail to see how this solves anything. Once you get malware on your computer, that malwar
by kalleboo 15y ago
> Lets say you've got a 'fob' which is plugged into a USB port
I still fail to see how this solves anything. Once you get malware on your computer, that malware can send requests to the USB device, and you're back at square one.
One of the features of RSA security fobs is that only someone physically present can use it. What you've made is an RSA fob that's vulnerable to viruses.
- ChuckMcM 15y agoThe protocol between the service and the FOB allows for any program sitting on the computer to snoop the entire exchange and be unable to reproduce it. The simplest example of this was the Millicent protocol which used an MD5 running backwards as a one time pad, although that had other issues. But lets say that at the 'introduction' stage the service set a cookie with the fob by saying 'remember this about me, I'll call my self ecb994af and your magic number is 3551eff' then later on verification passes it sends a message encrypted by its self key to 'tell me your magic number divided by 2 and encrypted with your id.' The attacker can see the whole sequence but if they don't understand what is being asked and returned they can't reproduce it, and they don't have the initial secrets either. There are lots of ways to do this with smart protocols. Something I tried (and failed) to patent back in the Java days where you sent a packet which could be executed. The nice thing about such protocols is they can be dynamically designed between device and service and malware is stuck out in the cold. There are things it cannot protect against, malware running in the Google servers or Amazon's for that matter which has access to all of their server data. But if it does get compromised it only compromises one relationship, no additional damage is done because other systems can have their own protocols, their own dynamic data.
- kalleboo 15y agoFor this to work, you'd need a trusted connection between the fob and the server. So this reduces down to relying on a CA system, which first of all isn't open, and second we now know works very poorly. Heck and on the USB device you wouldn't even have a secure way to able to update the CA store to remove bad actors.
- kragen 15y agoIf the fob is issued by the company that runs the server, the company can put keys into the fob before they mail it to you. No CAs needed.