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That's incorrect. In World War 1 both sides had extremely rigid operational plans. The German operational plan even included specific times down to the hour, fo

That's incorrect. In World War 1 both sides had extremely rigid operational plans. The German operational plan even included specific times down to the hour, for when specific bridges and road junctions should be captured. Indeed, what saved the Entente in World War 1 was the fact that Belgium, which had been expected to roll over and allow the German army unmolested free passage, actually called up its military and fought. That ruined the German timetables, allowing France to complete its mobilization and brought the British into the war preventing a quick German victory on the Western Front. Towards the end of the war, yes, Germany was beginning to move towards what we would consider a "commander's intent"-based system. Erwin Rommel's text, Infantry Attacks, captures this transition. However, it's inaccurate to say that the German military was any less rigid than the British. It is also inaccurate to say that the death rates of the German army were any less than they were for the British. Perhaps in 1914 and 1915, as well-trained German regulars were facing off against the "Pals Brigades", the Germans inflicted more casualties than they received. But by the end of the war, as the German economy was crumbling and the prospect of US involvement made the German generals desperate, they resorted to mass infantry charges with relatively untrained soldiers, and took extremely heavy casualties as a result. If anything, your description of the German army is more accurate for the Wehrmacht in World War 2 than it is for the Kaiser's army.

WalterBright 4y ago
Ferguson, the author, backs it up with statistics. "As Table 32 shows, the greatest of all the paradoxes of the First World War is that, despite being disastrously disadvantaged in economic terms, the Central Powers were far more successful in inflicting death on their enemies. According to the best available totals for wartime military deaths, some 5.4 million men fighting for the Entente powers and their allies lost their lives, the overwhelming majority of them killed by the enemy. The equivalent total for the Central Powers is just over 4 million. The Central Powers' superiority in killing was thus of the order of 35 per cent. The official British statistics published shortly after the war give an even higher margin of 50 per cent, as do the figures in a number of modern textbooks.52 In other words, the Central Powers were at least a third better at mass slaughter." pg 294 "The trouble was - and here the excuses must stop - that the entire culture of the British regular army militated against effective improvisation. The command structure was based on obedience to superiors and suspicion of subordinates; men could still advance according to their connections; and commanders could still be 'unstuck' by personal quarrels.83 This could have serious repercussions: when Haig questioned Rawlinson's original Somme plan, the latter felt unable to stand his ground, with the result that Haig was able to insist on the suicidal breakthrough objective. As Rawlinson said, 'It is a gamble to go for an unlimited offensive but D. H. wants it and I am prepared to undertake anything within reason [sic].'84 An Army Commander did not presume to correct the Commander-in-Chief, even when tens of thousands of men's lives were at stake.85 Similar inhibitions existed at every level. Orders were issued at the top and fed down the line; there was little traffic in the other direction. As a result, officers, NCOs and men grew accustomed to 'waiting for orders'. In battle, as J. M. Bourne has remarked, 'when German shelling interrupted communications paralysis set in'. To adapt the not inappropriate language of industrial organization, this was 'line management', and it provided no mechanism by which the views of 'junior line managers' could be relayed back to head office.86 Partly for this reason, the proponents of a more technocratic approach made slow headway against the traditional believers in war as a moral rather than material contest.87 Too much emphasis was placed on morale, courage and discipline; not enough on fire-power and tactics." pg 305 "These German tactical strengths were rooted in a distinctive military culture. According to Dupuy, the German military establishment had 'discovered the secret of institutionalizing military excellence'.109 Martin Samuels likewise points to a distinctively German philosophy of combat, which acknowledged its fundamentally chaotic character.'10 This in turn influenced the way command structures evolved. The Germans favoured 'directive command' (task-oriented and decentralized decision making, flexible at all levels) whereas the British preferred 'restrictive control', which deliberately discouraged initiative."1 Differences in training also followed logically from this. German 'chaos theory' demanded a high level of training to promote adaptability; the British approach required only obedience. Moreover, the German officer did not stop learning on obtaining his commission; the officer corps was meritocratic, and dud officers were ruthlessly weeded out."2 This line of argument has been further developed by the work of Gudmundsson on stormtroop tactics, which (he argues) depended for their success on the existence of a 'self-educating officer corps'."3 pg 309 If that's not enough, there's plenty more backup in the book. It's a good read, I recommend it.
- quanticle 4y ago
  That's very interesting! My understanding of World War 1 is from Tuchman's The Guns of August and Clark's The Sleepwalkers, and both of those don't seem to rate the Germans as being more flexible at the beginning of the war than the British.
  - WalterBright 4y ago
    There's endless more stuff to read! I only made it through half of TGoA, and didn't know about TS. Thanks for the tip!

WalterBright 4y ago

Ferguson, the author, backs it up with statistics. "As Table 32 shows, the greatest of all the paradoxes of the First World War is that, despite being disastrously disadvantaged in economic terms, the Central Powers were far more successful in inflicting death on their enemies. According to the best available totals for wartime military deaths, some 5.4 million men fighting for the Entente powers and their allies lost their lives, the overwhelming majority of them killed by the enemy. The equivalent total for the Central Powers is just over 4 million. The Central Powers' superiority in killing was thus of the order of 35 per cent. The official British statistics published shortly after the war give an even higher margin of 50 per cent, as do the figures in a number of modern textbooks.52 In other words, the Central Powers were at least a third better at mass slaughter." pg 294 "The trouble was - and here the excuses must stop - that the entire culture of the British regular army militated against effective improvisation. The command structure was based on obedience to superiors and suspicion of subordinates; men could still advance according to their connections; and commanders could still be 'unstuck' by personal quarrels.83 This could have serious repercussions: when Haig questioned Rawlinson's original Somme plan, the latter felt unable to stand his ground, with the result that Haig was able to insist on the suicidal breakthrough objective. As Rawlinson said, 'It is a gamble to go for an unlimited offensive but D. H. wants it and I am prepared to undertake anything within reason [sic].'84 An Army Commander did not presume to correct the Commander-in-Chief, even when tens of thousands of men's lives were at stake.85 Similar inhibitions existed at every level. Orders were issued at the top and fed down the line; there was little traffic in the other direction. As a result, officers, NCOs and men grew accustomed to 'waiting for orders'. In battle, as J. M. Bourne has remarked, 'when German shelling interrupted communications paralysis set in'. To adapt the not inappropriate language of industrial organization, this was 'line management', and it provided no mechanism by which the views of 'junior line managers' could be relayed back to head office.86 Partly for this reason, the proponents of a more technocratic approach made slow headway against the traditional believers in war as a moral rather than material contest.87 Too much emphasis was placed on morale, courage and discipline; not enough on fire-power and tactics." pg 305 "These German tactical strengths were rooted in a distinctive military culture. According to Dupuy, the German military establishment had 'discovered the secret of institutionalizing military excellence'.109 Martin Samuels likewise points to a distinctively German philosophy of combat, which acknowledged its fundamentally chaotic character.'10 This in turn influenced the way command structures evolved. The Germans favoured 'directive command' (task-oriented and decentralized decision making, flexible at all levels) whereas the British preferred 'restrictive control', which deliberately discouraged initiative."1 Differences in training also followed logically from this. German 'chaos theory' demanded a high level of training to promote adaptability; the British approach required only obedience. Moreover, the German officer did not stop learning on obtaining his commission; the officer corps was meritocratic, and dud officers were ruthlessly weeded out."2 This line of argument has been further developed by the work of Gudmundsson on stormtroop tactics, which (he argues) depended for their success on the existence of a 'self-educating officer corps'."3 pg 309 If that's not enough, there's plenty more backup in the book. It's a good read, I recommend it.

quanticle 4y ago
That's very interesting! My understanding of World War 1 is from Tuchman's The Guns of August and Clark's The Sleepwalkers, and both of those don't seem to rate the Germans as being more flexible at the beginning of the war than the British.
- WalterBright 4y ago
  There's endless more stuff to read! I only made it through half of TGoA, and didn't know about TS. Thanks for the tip!