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There were lots of things that went wrong with AF 447 but the side sticks were a minor detail. If anything the stall warning going on and off was a much bigger
by inferiorhuman 5y ago
There were lots of things that went wrong with AF 447 but the side sticks were a minor detail. If anything the stall warning going on and off was a much bigger factor because the one pilot kept pulling back on the stick which is the exact opposite of what he should've done. Had the pilot flying simply flown pitch and power they would've been fine and had plenty of time to calmly troubleshoot the situation.
> I thought Boeing did not have sidesticks, and the
> yokes/control columns are linked to give actual feedback
> (to emulate most airplanes, which do this with mechanical
> controls). Is that not the case?
Boeing's philosophy seems to be to provide physical feedback for most or all of the controls. So, yeah, the control columns are linked (even on fly-by-wire planes like the 777 and 787). But that's not very useful once you're dealing with startled and/or panicked pilots. Take a look at the Atlas Air or Sriwijaya Air crashes.
The problem with Air France has nothing to do with Boeing or Airbus and everything to do with pilot standards and training. At this point Air France is lucky. Look at the Air France incident in 2020 (A318). Or their incident in Bogota in 2017 (A340). Or the 2011, 2012 x2, and 2013 incidents where the Airbus (A320/321) alpha floor protection prevented an Air France crew from crashing on approach to Marseille x2, Hamburg, and Tel Aviv. At some point Air France's luck will run out.
- travisgriggs 5y ago> If anything the stall warning going on and off was a much bigger factor because the one pilot kept pulling back on the stick which is the exact opposite of what he should've done. Private pilot here. This is so hard. It’s not an excuse, especially for professional pilots. But I can share from experience how much your “animal brain” fights you in this situation. Pulling back leverages lift in most normal flight, until you go too slow (stall), and then you suddenly very much need to do the opposite. But the normal behavior becomes second nature, like walking. My examiner in 2020 said the biggest thing the FAA was stressing about was a serious uptick in incidents with slow flight (and stall) handling during takeoff/landings. A year ago, we had an experienced local private pilot wreck his plane (lucky no major injuries) succumbing to exactly this. Took off, lift conditions a little worse than normal, started to leave ground effect, felt the plane stall, pulled back, started losing altitude, panicked and pulled back harder, tailed down and fell side wards. Plane totaled. He recounted to me after how he knew what to do. He’s trained multiple times. Done lots of stall recovery. Has done many many short field takeoffs (which is similar, pop the plane off the ground and then stay low to build speed). But was still chagrined at how panick/situation management got the better of him that time. Being master of your animal brain in all situations is hard. And you never know, because you can never test all situations.
- inferiorhuman 5y agoSure. There are some things in aviation that are counterintuitive: recovering from a stall is one of those. That's why commercial aviation in the United States places such a strong emphasis on regular training (and why commercial aviation in the US is as safe as it is). Unfortunately stall physics are something that flight simulators don't tend to do so well at. Another counterintuitive thing is that tactile feedback isn't necessarily helpful. There's a lot of whinging about how Airbus doesn't provide any feedback in the sidestick when both pilots are doing conflicting things, same with the thrust levers (or whatever they're called in Airbus land). Pilots have crashed Boeing airliners that give you this "important" feedback. Anyways, my point was that stall recovery is something that's usually drilled into pilots. Unfortunately for the AF 447 crew, nobody told them that the stall warning would turn off when they flew so far outside the envelope that they were in "undefined behavior" territory. And that led to at least one of the pilots not recognizing that they'd stalled in the first place. But like any crash there are many contributing factors, and if any one of those had been different the plane wouldn't have crashed. If it were just one or two examples of poor airmanship at Air France then sure, it'd be easy to chalk it up to "flying is hard". And yeah, the pandemic has robbed a lot of pilots of their necessary practice. But the four or five cases I cited where Airbus' "alpha floor protection" saved Air France flights were all pre-pandemic. At some point you've gotta look at what those incidents and accidents have in common (hint: it's not the airplane and not the crew). And that's why my main concern is with Air France's lack of safety culture and by extension their pilot training.
- HeyLaughingBoy 5y ago> commercial aviation in the United States places such a strong emphasis on regular training This in a nutshell is why I never completed my Private Pilot training. As I got close to taking my checkride I began to think about finances going forward. And I realized that I probably couldn't afford to fly often enough to keep my skills sharp and a dull pilot is a dangerous pilot. 25 years later I'm still alive so I think I made the right decision :-)