3 ms·
I imagine point B is quite relevant here. MCAS going wrong is meaningfully different (and less immediately scary) from the recall procedure that the training do
by rocqua 5y ago
I imagine point B is quite relevant here. MCAS going wrong is meaningfully different (and less immediately scary) from the recall procedure that the training doesn't kick in.
- mlyle 5y agoSure. The main points I have, I guess, are: - It's perhaps understandable why engineering teams-- pushed by management to deliver a 737 that doesn't require retraining-- decided that if flight crews could handle runaway trim, they could handle any errant MCAS activations and that the level of redundancy and fault tolerance necessary in the system would be low. - On the other hand, real flight crews obviously do not do great when exposed to this test. - If you give a flight crew a wacky situation with conflicting information (like AF447 or the 737 MAX)-- expect failures, even if the situation is technically 100% recoverable and flyable and some crews exposed to the situation succeed. It's great that we have humans capable of reason up in the front of the plane, but reason is often faulty and doesn't get you the solution you need on the first try.