> This was 10 seconds 10 seconds is a long time of the trim wheel being cranked nose up. The same situation would apply to a stuck trim switch on the yoke. (

> This was 10 seconds 10 seconds is a long time of the trim wheel being cranked nose up. The same situation would apply to a stuck trim switch on the yoke. (Indeed, a stuck trim switch is worse in this respect because it cranks constantly and doesn't "yield" to the pilot pushing the switch the other way... of course, the checklist didn't presume a pilot should be diagnosing stuck AOA vs. stuck trim switch and thus recommended immediate use of the trim cutout switches instead of trying to electrically trim the other way). There's a reason that trim runaway is a "recall" procedure in the QRH that pilots are expected to know-- it gets scary. http://www.b737.org.uk/images/runawaystab2020.jpg http://www.b737.org.uk/images/runawaystab2020.jpg But it was the assumption before the MCAS disaster that pilots could deal with trim runaway, given that there was a history of flight crews dealing with trim runaway incidents in flight successfully. But MCAS was worse because: A) It did it more often, so flight crews were exposed to this dangerous situation more than ever before B) It did it in a sneakier, strange way (no constant movement of the trim wheel). Still, some real-world flight crews did overcome MCAS doing the wrong thing without crashing, even if others failed the test.