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> Notably still no web standards for end to end encryption TLS is end to end encryption. Maybe you are wanting something like Noise[0]? It's already a standa

by zie 5y ago

> Notably still no web standards for end to end encryption TLS is end to end encryption. Maybe you are wanting something like Noise[0]? It's already a standard in many respects and nacl's crypto_box[1] stuff also exists. Why should it be a "web standard"? Browsers are already stupidly complicated(arguably as complicated as operating systems). I'd argue they don't need more complexity. > Nitrokey at least understood how biased & half assed this lopsided half-assed standardizing is Well webauthn is specific to one thing only. It doesn't want to get into all the other things, there are good solutions for almost all of that stuff already. > Yubico doesnt seem to notice or care, they're happy pushing better ways to uniquely identify ourselves. For E2E encryption, you have to uniquely prove your identity or it's pointless. Thankfully webauthn just specifies the crypto part and doesn't mandate personal identification. 0: https://noiseprotocol.org/ https://noiseprotocol.org/ 1: https://nacl.cr.yp.to/box.html https://nacl.cr.yp.to/box.html

rektide 5y ago
this feels like yet more inordinately & vastly incorrect obvious hogwash. how is tls end to end? it's literally you to your immediate service: it will never ever be end to end by definition. could it be any more obvious? why does such an obviously irrelevamt non-sequitor keep showing up? if the server you are talking with can decrypt it, it means it's not a secure channel. definitional, inarguable, basic. how can are all the replies so wrong? what is this conspiracy against reason? what definition of e2e encryption are you using, when i communicate with my friend, and how does it accomodate this twisted ass warped "google can so read my messages" flagrantly incorrect viciously wrong misinformation view that merely having singleink tls security that you & other dude argue for? why is everyone so up on being immoral & misleading & wrong here about end-to-end encryptiom? it secures a connection. but data going from party to party traverses multiple parties. end to end encryption, by definition, is not encryption between you & the service: it's between you & the other party. intensely fantastically stupidly wrong & insistent argumentation keeps happening. i keep getting downvoted, ya'll keep making wrong posts with way off base claims. so sad. hopeless universe. again, folks lole nitrokey saw exactly this weakness, this inability for current web crypto standards tk ever help secure user data from the services they connected to, something tls cannot ever help with. but ya'll keep focusing.on the tiniestost irrelevant hop of data, keep insisting one leg of encrytion is equal to end to end. no.
- zie 5y ago
  Sorry, it's you misunderstanding. TLS doesn't require that it's a client to a server, TLS doesn't care, TLS says this connection from A <-> B is secure, that's it. 99% of deployed TLS is client to server, but it doesn't have to be. TLS IS however limited to 1 connection A <-> B. I think what you are trying to talk about is: You want A to talk THROUGH B to get to C and have the connection secure between A and C. This is generally a terrible idea, if you can at all avoid it, but sadly for many reasons, we can't. And you are right TLS can't do this. Noise totally does this, which I linked to in my first comment. So We are just talking about different meanings behind E2E. E2E == End To End, i.e. both ends are secure from eavesdroppers, TLS 100% fits this bill, as each end of the connection is secure. You seem to imply E2E is ONLY defined as encryption through some other connection, i.e. A <-> B <-> C, where B can't inspect/understand the contents. It's important to know that, even with E2E as you seem to be defining it, there is still a LOT of data leakage, B knows that A is talking to C, they maybe can't uniquely identify who A and C are directly, but they probably can indirectly. There is 100% a reason that NSA and friends care a lot about metadata and learn a ton from it. Hence why P2P (i.e. talk directly to the person you want to talk to, nothing in the middle) is way better from a security perspective, less metadata to exploit. If the Internet was better, Signal wouldn't have to use Noise and shunt traffic through their servers, and we could just use TLS directly between you and I for instance. Anyways, I hope this helps further your education and you learned something.
  - rektide 5y ago
    This has been useful. It still is wildly off target from what I see as a core weakness with the web, which is that security keys cant be used to help a client create secure data. We can only authenticate ourselves with keys, not protect ourselves. The server we are talking to has more favor than us. Introducing the term e2e was a mistake, & mislead everything. TLS isnt really a factor. It was frustrating being so very very far off course from the relevant problem. But I certainly didnt handle this drift well at all & was frustrated at being so off topic from such a vital & core web weakness.
    - zie 5y ago

by zie 5y ago

rektide 5y ago

this feels like yet more inordinately & vastly incorrect obvious hogwash. how is tls end to end? it's literally you to your immediate service: it will never ever be end to end by definition. could it be any more obvious? why does such an obviously irrelevamt non-sequitor keep showing up? if the server you are talking with can decrypt it, it means it's not a secure channel. definitional, inarguable, basic. how can are all the replies so wrong? what is this conspiracy against reason? what definition of e2e encryption are you using, when i communicate with my friend, and how does it accomodate this twisted ass warped "google can so read my messages" flagrantly incorrect viciously wrong misinformation view that merely having singleink tls security that you & other dude argue for? why is everyone so up on being immoral & misleading & wrong here about end-to-end encryptiom? it secures a connection. but data going from party to party traverses multiple parties. end to end encryption, by definition, is not encryption between you & the service: it's between you & the other party. intensely fantastically stupidly wrong & insistent argumentation keeps happening. i keep getting downvoted, ya'll keep making wrong posts with way off base claims. so sad. hopeless universe. again, folks lole nitrokey saw exactly this weakness, this inability for current web crypto standards tk ever help secure user data from the services they connected to, something tls cannot ever help with. but ya'll keep focusing.on the tiniestost irrelevant hop of data, keep insisting one leg of encrytion is equal to end to end. no.

zie 5y ago
Sorry, it's you misunderstanding. TLS doesn't require that it's a client to a server, TLS doesn't care, TLS says this connection from A <-> B is secure, that's it. 99% of deployed TLS is client to server, but it doesn't have to be. TLS IS however limited to 1 connection A <-> B. I think what you are trying to talk about is: You want A to talk THROUGH B to get to C and have the connection secure between A and C. This is generally a terrible idea, if you can at all avoid it, but sadly for many reasons, we can't. And you are right TLS can't do this. Noise totally does this, which I linked to in my first comment. So We are just talking about different meanings behind E2E. E2E == End To End, i.e. both ends are secure from eavesdroppers, TLS 100% fits this bill, as each end of the connection is secure. You seem to imply E2E is ONLY defined as encryption through some other connection, i.e. A <-> B <-> C, where B can't inspect/understand the contents. It's important to know that, even with E2E as you seem to be defining it, there is still a LOT of data leakage, B knows that A is talking to C, they maybe can't uniquely identify who A and C are directly, but they probably can indirectly. There is 100% a reason that NSA and friends care a lot about metadata and learn a ton from it. Hence why P2P (i.e. talk directly to the person you want to talk to, nothing in the middle) is way better from a security perspective, less metadata to exploit. If the Internet was better, Signal wouldn't have to use Noise and shunt traffic through their servers, and we could just use TLS directly between you and I for instance. Anyways, I hope this helps further your education and you learned something.
- rektide 5y ago
  This has been useful. It still is wildly off target from what I see as a core weakness with the web, which is that security keys cant be used to help a client create secure data. We can only authenticate ourselves with keys, not protect ourselves. The server we are talking to has more favor than us. Introducing the term e2e was a mistake, & mislead everything. TLS isnt really a factor. It was frustrating being so very very far off course from the relevant problem. But I certainly didnt handle this drift well at all & was frustrated at being so off topic from such a vital & core web weakness.
  - zie 5y ago