> Is is possible there is a tendency/bias to simply view ourselves as more independant and any adversary we face as more "drone" like ? This is possible, but t

> Is is possible there is a tendency/bias to simply view ourselves as more independant and any adversary we face as more "drone" like ? This is possible, but the US tries to keep an accurate (or even slightly overinflated; see prewar predictions of Russia's combat effectiveness) idea of how skilled potential adversaries are. As other comments have pointed out, Auftragstaktik (also known as mission tactics) is an ideal many armies try to reach for. It's possible that it's the ideal form of command and control, but that's not guaranteed. Mission tactics is sorta kinda not really Agile for the military (in the sense it was originally intended by the Agile Manifesto). This can work, or it can result in something like Google where promotions are tied to going off and making something new, not maintaining what you already have. This sort of thinking is particularly dangerous in war though, because war is a continuation of politics by violent means, and therefore strategy and tactics _must_ be tied to the overall international politics of the state. Individual initiative can result in somebody finding a brilliant new strategy or coming up with a genius plan that would've never made it through an overbearing top-down command structure, or it can result in something like the Japanese military in the Second World War or the German military during both World Wars. The Japanese military of the Second World War was essentially the head of a military dictatorship, with the added complication that the Army and Navy hated each other. Japanese grand strategy was largely driven by the actions of junior officers who'd go out and do something ridiculous, like when a Japanese lieutenant tried to destroy a rail line and blame the incident on the Chinese, giving his superiors a pretext to invade China, as in the case of the Mukden Incident. Japanese officers, empowered to make decisions for the nation by their own individual initiative, were ultimately responsible for the massive unnecessary loss of life by their continual refusal to even consider negotiations, even far after it was clear to everyone involved on both sides that the Japanese couldn't win. The German military's descent into individual initiative madness began after Napoleon beat what was assumed to be the most powerful army in Europe at Jena-Auerstedt. Clausewitz, who formulated the "war is a continuation of politics by other means" line above, essentially saw the battle as proof that it was impossible to plan a battle from the top down due to the inherent friction and fog of war of military operations, which the German military refined into their concept of Auftragstaktik. After the Austro-Prussian and the Franco-Prussian Wars, the German Command Staff was convinced they'd found the key to key to winning battles by empowering their subordinates. Unfortunately, they also applied that principle upwards and worked to lessen civilian oversight of the military. Of course, the tangled web of alliances, treaties, and mobilization timetables made the First World War somewhat inevitable, but what's striking is just how little effort went into preventing it at all: the German military was convinced that once the die was cast there was no point in trying to stop the war. The civilian government, convinced by the military that the best way to operate was to give the military an objective and then stay out of their way, let them. I want to be clear: there's many instances throughout history of the military gaining control over the government, but in Germany's case the military didn't gain control over the civilian government, nor did they want to. They simply wanted the civilian government to have as little power as possible over them. Later in the war the government was absorbed by the military, but it didn't start out that way. This separation of concerns led to the "stab in the back" myth after the war, where the Germans believed that the army was unfairly tampered with by the government. The causes of the rise of Hitler and Nazism involve more than just Auftragstaktik writ large, but the concept of giving subordinates an objective and letting them go certainly didn't help. In particular, the Nazi state was marked by constant infighting by independent agencies: the military had numerous intelligence agencies with overlapping responsibilities who competed for information for example. Now it may seem a bit of a leap to blame small-unit tactics for Fascism, but in the same way war is just politics extended into warfighting, doctrine is just culture extended into warfighting. The success of FAANG companies and startups is often attributed to the development of modern Agile-type software development practices, which shape the workflow, leadership style, and culture of successful companies, while toxic Agile practices are often blamed for the death of others. In the same way, the indoctrination of military leaders that the best way to lead is to empower subordinates, and the reinforcement of that principle throughout the leader's career all the way to the top, is responsible for, for example, the brilliant success of the first Gulf War, and the mediocre quagmire of the second Gulf War. Returning to your original question, yes, the US and the West in general tends to view individual initiative as better than other systems, and we like to believe we're better at it that other militaries, due to the great success of mission tactics throughout history. But at the same time the West, in particular Germany who's had particularly bad experiences with mission tactics gone wrong, try to limit just how empowered the military can be, by ensuring the military stays under strict civilian control. As you might be able to guess from my general interest in military history, I'm a strong supported of a powerful military, but despite that I'm an even stronger supporter of a civilian controlled military.