4 ms·
> Serious cyberattacks on industrial equipment aren’t common and take significant knowledge to prepare, according to security experts. Nonsense. All it takes
by Syonyk 5y ago
> Serious cyberattacks on industrial equipment aren’t common and take significant knowledge to prepare, according to security experts.
Nonsense. All it takes is "caring enough to put in a bit of effort to figure out how to do it."
The reason we haven't seen them, historically (and IMO...) is that nobody in the "evil hacker space" has generally been willing to attack actual physical targets directly. Over the past decade or so, we've seen a shift from "Only large, well funded actors attack physical infrastructure" (Stuxnet) to "More and more attacks on things increasingly close to physical infrastructure" (various pipeline attacks, the assorted industrial control system malware toolkits, etc). It's only a matter of time until the actual physical stuff is attacked, and this may or may not qualify - it sounds like the administrative side was attacked, but (perhaps?) not the actual turbines. Yet.
The reality of control systems is just like that of anything else "digital" and "microchip" and "connected to a network" - they're not secure against a wide range of attackers, and the only saving grace is that most of them haven't been targeted by a sufficiently motivated adversary.
We, as a general software ecosystem across a range of disciplines, add complexity faster (in hardware and software) faster than we understand and fix bugs. Shipping new things gets people promoted, "fixing weird old bugs in some poorly understood subsystem" doesn't - even if that archaic subsystem is useful to display (poorly encoded and often wrong) Xerox scans. See one of Apple's recent 0days...
If you want a "secure" system for industrial control, it can't be network connected anymore. Yes, it's convenient, and the tradeoff is that someone can and will hack it, some day. Does it matter? Up to you and your company.
But "air gaps" don't work, "Well, we'll use antivirus..." doesn't seem to matter, and "network connected computers" just suck at anything involving security.
- BLKNSLVR 5y ago> All it takes is "caring enough to put in a bit of effort to figure out how to do it." Which points to the statement "Serious cyberattacks on industrial equipment aren’t common and take significant knowledge to prepare" being true. The primary reason probably being that there are more profitable and more easily exploitable targets out there. Why go for the anything but the low-hanging fruit first? Conflict situations (invasion, war, pandemic) change priorities pretty significantly.
- ngcc_hk 5y agoActually there are some network based scanner trying to handle this using AI to spot usual and unusual traffic. Seems good but not well known (and I guess given the attention the vendor is more office system not industrial system oriented). The problem as said is management. Those on top of these might not have the mindset to handle this angle. After all they are more engineer firm and organisation. And some may still have the security by obscurity and isolation-alone (then someone to mgt it via home use an open dial up …). It is the mentality and the market absence which is the key barrier of entry. Antivirus btw is useless even in office IT. Baseline yes. But useful no. Any decent professional hacker know the big few and test against them down to try to test whether it is in such env and react differently. Still think network based scanner etc is the better approach. Of course one worry about service denial by fake attack … still …