4 ms·
...and then the enemy surprise-attacks you in your own airspace and easily shoots down all your planes?
by adastra22 5y ago
...and then the enemy surprise-attacks you in your own airspace and easily shoots down all your planes?
- hasmolo 5y agoall guns should have a safety...
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- Diesel555 5y agoMy comment, as well as the parent post, refers to training. When not in training, the placement of armament switches, as well as many other risk avoidance measures, will vary based on the type of conflict and risk. There is a good article from a Ukrainian fighter pilot you can read to see the extreme opposite of the training environment (high risk flight with enemy overhead). The most surprising thing is that he doesn't run pre-flight checks. I bet he took off with those switches armed. > https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44877/ukrainian-fighter-pilots-describe-their-desperate-air-war-against-russia https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44877/ukrainian-fighte...
- ChuckMcM 5y agoThis comment is correct, it is not "normal" to enable the RADAR threat subsystem on training runs or when just flying along in your own airspace. The fault here was on the check pilot who thought it would be "fun" to turn that subsystem on to see the reaction.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- _moof 5y agoNo one is making a surprise attack on one airplane over Sunnyvale. Just look at this from a risk management perspective. Chance of aircraft being surprise-attacked in extremely well-defended airspace during peacetime: essentially zero. Consequences of that aircraft being surprise-attacked: loss of one aircraft and crew. Chance of inadvertent release of weapons and/or countermeasures when switched on: apparently not zero, given the trainee's response. (An automatic response that I would be very, very, very pleased to see as an instructor!) Consequences: potential loss of civilian life and/or property. So you have zero * (1 airplane + 1 crew), versus non-zero * (? civilians + ? buildings). I know which side of that inequality I'm landing on.
- adastra22 5y agoNo one was making surprise attacks against Honolulu in 1940, either. The point of the military is to be credibly prepared for even low likelihood events (which, due to game theory, is what makes them low likelihood in the first place).
- the__alchemist 5y agoYou don't arm switches like that in training unless over a suitable area, like the water. Combat is different, where you may keep it armed on TO and landing for the reason discussed.
- jeffdn 5y agoThere also weren’t reconnaissance satellites in 1941 that would detect some fleet leaving Vladivostok (or some western Chinese port). There weren’t over the horizon radars, or airborne interceptors with radar that can see hundreds of miles. It’s a completely different scenario in almost every way. Finally, no current potential enemy state has the kind of aircraft carrier fleet needed to perform that the of attack. The U.K. and China both have two active carriers, but the Chinese are still training up. The Japanese launched about 300 planes from six carriers. Nowadays, any surprise attack on the United States would be a counterforce launch of hundreds of ICBMs and SLBMs with at most twenty minutes of warning to launch a response, and hours to launch a second strike, assuming command and control networks remained active.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- hnbad 5y agoWhat do you think does the risk-reward tradeooff look like between the risk of accidentally firing a live rocket in friendly territory and delayed response in an invasion that somehow managed to sneak by all early warning systems to the point where one unexpectant figher pilot has to intervene within milliseconds? The only scenario after the invention of modern surveillance/detection mechanisms I can think of would have been 9/11 and in that case the problem wasn't reaction time but red tape, identification of compromised airplanes and willingness to shoot down civilian planes full of American citizens who might already be trying to recapture the plane.