4 ms·
> That made the RADAR LOCK alarm go off in the cockpit and the trainee, as he was trained to do, immediately hit countermeasures without thinking. (That will sa
by Diesel555 4y ago
> That made the RADAR LOCK alarm go off in the cockpit and the trainee, as he was trained to do, immediately hit countermeasures without thinking. (That will save your life!)
And this is why there are armament switching which you turn on only when you enter approved airspace to employ weapons / countermeasures and turn off when you leave (and vocalize on the radio to do so for the rest of the jets in the formation). Then pushing the button which releases weapons or countermeasures does nothing.
- adastra22 4y ago...and then the enemy surprise-attacks you in your own airspace and easily shoots down all your planes?
- hasmolo 4y agoall guns should have a safety...
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- Diesel555 4y agoMy comment, as well as the parent post, refers to training. When not in training, the placement of armament switches, as well as many other risk avoidance measures, will vary based on the type of conflict and risk. There is a good article from a Ukrainian fighter pilot you can read to see the extreme opposite of the training environment (high risk flight with enemy overhead). The most surprising thing is that he doesn't run pre-flight checks. I bet he took off with those switches armed. > https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44877/ukrainian-fighter-pilots-describe-their-desperate-air-war-against-russia https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44877/ukrainian-fighte...
- ChuckMcM 4y agoThis comment is correct, it is not "normal" to enable the RADAR threat subsystem on training runs or when just flying along in your own airspace. The fault here was on the check pilot who thought it would be "fun" to turn that subsystem on to see the reaction.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- _moof 4y agoNo one is making a surprise attack on one airplane over Sunnyvale. Just look at this from a risk management perspective. Chance of aircraft being surprise-attacked in extremely well-defended airspace during peacetime: essentially zero. Consequences of that aircraft being surprise-attacked: loss of one aircraft and crew. Chance of inadvertent release of weapons and/or countermeasures when switched on: apparently not zero, given the trainee's response. (An automatic response that I would be very, very, very pleased to see as an instructor!) Consequences: potential loss of civilian life and/or property. So you have zero * (1 airplane + 1 crew), versus non-zero * (? civilians + ? buildings). I know which side of that inequality I'm landing on.
- adastra22 4y agoNo one was making surprise attacks against Honolulu in 1940, either. The point of the military is to be credibly prepared for even low likelihood events (which, due to game theory, is what makes them low likelihood in the first place).
- the__alchemist 4y agoYou don't arm switches like that in training unless over a suitable area, like the water. Combat is different, where you may keep it armed on TO and landing for the reason discussed.
- jeffdn 4y agoThere also weren’t reconnaissance satellites in 1941 that would detect some fleet leaving Vladivostok (or some western Chinese port). There weren’t over the horizon radars, or airborne interceptors with radar that can see hundreds of miles. It’s a completely different scenario in almost every way. Finally, no current potential enemy state has the kind of aircraft carrier fleet needed to perform that the of attack. The U.K. and China both have two active carriers, but the Chinese are still training up. The Japanese launched about 300 planes from six carriers. Nowadays, any surprise attack on the United States would be a counterforce launch of hundreds of ICBMs and SLBMs with at most twenty minutes of warning to launch a response, and hours to launch a second strike, assuming command and control networks remained active.
- scarier 4y agoI mean, it wouldn't be the first time someone forgot one or two of their FENCE checks...