4 ms·
Indeed, but still, one SSRF vulnerability in anything on the host and the attacker can reconfigure Caddy to serve up any other resource on any of the networks t
by rekoil 5y ago
Indeed, but still, one SSRF vulnerability in anything on the host and the attacker can reconfigure Caddy to serve up any other resource on any of the networks the host can access, or deny access to any resources served by Caddy.
It's an unnecessary security risk is all I'm saying, and I personally would have preferred it was authenticated or off by default.
I really love Caddy, you've built an amazing piece of software, I just disagree with your design decision on this one little thing. It's good that you put that notice in the docs at least!
- mholt 5y agoGlad you love Caddy. If the host is popped, I'm not sure what Caddy can do to save you. Even authentication has to be stored on the machine... that was popped.
- rekoil 5y agoSSRF and RCE are different things. Being able to throw requests to localhost and accessing the host filesystem don't necessarily have to be the same vulnerabilities, but I'll concede that SSRF vulns are uncommon. I'm just worried that Caddy will be the source of "security misconfiguration" (1) findings in penetration test reports. It's my opinion that we as software engineers should strive not to leave our software insecure by default, is what I'm saying, and that's how I see Caddy 2's admin API. 1: https://owasp.org/Top10/A05_2021-Security_Misconfiguration/ https://owasp.org/Top10/A05_2021-Security_Misconfiguration/