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The Taliban Were Afghanistan’s Real Modernizers

6 points by barry-cotter 5y ago

barry-cotter 5y ago
> Popular explanations for Taliban success do not adequately explain these failures on the battlefield. Ultimately it was these failures—not the Taliban’s safe haven in Pakistan, or the corruption endemic to the government—that explain the course of the war. The contest between the two visions of Afghan society was decided on the field of battle. The Taliban control Afghanistan today because on that field their men fought longer and harder than their opponents. Malkasian attributes Taliban hardiness to ideological commitment. “More Afghans liked the government than the Taliban,” he concludes. “But more Afghans were willing to kill and be killed on behalf of the Taliban.” > This is an old story. The conquest of weak kingdoms and tribal orders by unitary state builders, fielding armies full of nationalist fervor and religious passion, was central to the West’s own journey to modernity. In the twenty-first century, the U.S. saw the same process repeat itself in Afghanistan—and fought it every step of the way. But American money and manpower could never have saved the old Afghanistan. In 2021, disciplined and united Taliban forces swept through the country. It was the end of the U.S. experiment in bringing the liberal order to Afghanistan. As Taliban fighters entered city after city, they arrived as the forces of a new and very different modernity.
wizwit999 5y ago
This commentary gets a lot wrong. I think it's typical of authors who are not from the culture they're observing, where the analysis reads like an academic formulaic amalgamation of points without understanding of nuance and subtext. First, it's bayah or bayat (بَيْعَة), not bayt (which means house). Understandable given the local pronunciation. For example, the bayah (allegiance) that he refers to is misunderstood. The bayah that religious scholars give is very different from a the bayah that Taliban maintained (and that sultans and caliphs took). The religious bayah between murshid and murid is symbolic and spiritual. For example, students often study at Darul Uloom Haqannia in Peshawar (origin of the famed Haqqani moniker). But to try to imply that this student when he returns to a village in Uruzgan has some formal chain of command back to the teachers in the madrassa is laughable and betrays the author's lack of cultural understanding. Also, Karzai was not some foil to the Taliban. Did you know prior to 2001, he actually tried to join the Taliban, as their ambassador to the UN (they rejected as they didn't want his family to become too powerful). If anything, Karzai is a classic example of the fact, that there wasn't any fundamental disagreement between the sides in this civil war, as the Americans wished, just plain old jockeying for power. The rapid fall in August was the ultimate proof of this. Also the point the author tries to make about "Pashtun honoring the living not the dead" is laughable and again shows the author's complete lack of cultural understanding. Martyrdom (Shahadah) is a basic concept instilled in Muslims, and especially in Afghans. Every single person knows the honor of a shaheed. The statement "no Afghan would ever kill himself for the sake of holy war" is so wrong that it makes the author lose any credibility. Overall, a hodgepodge reading and summary of the stated books trying to make a point about something the author clearly doesn't understand.

6 points by barry-cotter 5y ago

> Popular explanations for Taliban success do not adequately explain these failures on the battlefield. Ultimately it was these failures—not the Taliban’s safe haven in Pakistan, or the corruption endemic to the government—that explain the course of the war. The contest between the two visions of Afghan society was decided on the field of battle. The Taliban control Afghanistan today because on that field their men fought longer and harder than their opponents. Malkasian attributes Taliban hardiness to ideological commitment. “More Afghans liked the government than the Taliban,” he concludes. “But more Afghans were willing to kill and be killed on behalf of the Taliban.” > This is an old story. The conquest of weak kingdoms and tribal orders by unitary state builders, fielding armies full of nationalist fervor and religious passion, was central to the West’s own journey to modernity. In the twenty-first century, the U.S. saw the same process repeat itself in Afghanistan—and fought it every step of the way. But American money and manpower could never have saved the old Afghanistan. In 2021, disciplined and united Taliban forces swept through the country. It was the end of the U.S. experiment in bringing the liberal order to Afghanistan. As Taliban fighters entered city after city, they arrived as the forces of a new and very different modernity.

wizwit999 5y ago

This commentary gets a lot wrong. I think it's typical of authors who are not from the culture they're observing, where the analysis reads like an academic formulaic amalgamation of points without understanding of nuance and subtext. First, it's bayah or bayat (بَيْعَة), not bayt (which means house). Understandable given the local pronunciation. For example, the bayah (allegiance) that he refers to is misunderstood. The bayah that religious scholars give is very different from a the bayah that Taliban maintained (and that sultans and caliphs took). The religious bayah between murshid and murid is symbolic and spiritual. For example, students often study at Darul Uloom Haqannia in Peshawar (origin of the famed Haqqani moniker). But to try to imply that this student when he returns to a village in Uruzgan has some formal chain of command back to the teachers in the madrassa is laughable and betrays the author's lack of cultural understanding. Also, Karzai was not some foil to the Taliban. Did you know prior to 2001, he actually tried to join the Taliban, as their ambassador to the UN (they rejected as they didn't want his family to become too powerful). If anything, Karzai is a classic example of the fact, that there wasn't any fundamental disagreement between the sides in this civil war, as the Americans wished, just plain old jockeying for power. The rapid fall in August was the ultimate proof of this. Also the point the author tries to make about "Pashtun honoring the living not the dead" is laughable and again shows the author's complete lack of cultural understanding. Martyrdom (Shahadah) is a basic concept instilled in Muslims, and especially in Afghans. Every single person knows the honor of a shaheed. The statement "no Afghan would ever kill himself for the sake of holy war" is so wrong that it makes the author lose any credibility. Overall, a hodgepodge reading and summary of the stated books trying to make a point about something the author clearly doesn't understand.