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I don't think Sabine claims that we can't possibly discover a testable theory that also solves the black hole information loss paradox. However, that doesn't me
by tsimionescu 5y ago
I don't think Sabine claims that we can't possibly discover a testable theory that also solves the black hole information loss paradox. However, that doesn't mean that investigating the black hole information loss paradox problem itself is a good way of arriving at that theory.
Theoretical physics has always been most successful when investigating proven experimental inconsistencies - the measured invariance of the speed of light in different rest frames for special relativity, for example, or the photovoltaic effect or ultraviolet catastrophe for QM.
Investigating other effects of quantum gravity and arriving at a theory that can be tested here on Earth would potentially lead to a testable theory that also provides insights into black holes. Or, perhaps investigating the measurement problem could lead to a more fundamental non-linear theory (which QM would be only an approximation of) that would be consistent with information loss.
These are both much lower hanging fruit than worrying about effects that we have no hope of measuring (note that we can't even prove that burning a book doesn't lose information - it's just easier to explain where the information could, in principle, be going, but it's still impossible to measure with current or foreseeable technology).
Your example of gravitational waves is exactly on the money for this. If instead of focusing on the inertial & gravitational mass equality "coincidence" and on gravity's effect on light, Einstein had tried to come up with a model for gravitation waves as the only thing he investigated, chances are he would not have arrived at GR. Perhaps he would have arrived at some SR + gravity waves theory that would have taken 100 years or more to disprove, and missed all the other insights.
- spekcular 5y agoWas ultraviolet catastrophe really an experimental inconsistency? It seems to best understood as a theoretical inconsistency: The theory predicts a diverging (infinite) value, which we know would be wrong regardless of what the experimental evidence is. It's a mathematical problem, not an empirical one. You also give the example of "the measured invariance of the speed of light in different rest frames," but Einstein claims SR was motivated by the invariance of Maxwell's equations (a theoretical consideration), not e.g. Michelson–Morley. So it sure seems that investigating theoretical inconsistencies has motivated a lot of good work. I agree that, practically speaking, studying the black hole information paradox might not be so productive. Maybe there are special features of the problem that make it difficult to investigate productively through theoretical considerations alone. But this is not how I read Hossenfelder. Taking her blog post literally, she seems to be against theoretical investigations of any phenomenon (any inconsistency, etc.) where experimental tests aren't forthcoming. I think this is ridiculous. Maybe she doesn't actually believe this, but then she needs to make an argument specifically about the black hole information paradox and why this particular problem is unproductive, not launch a broadside on non-empirical reasoning more generally.
- tsimionescu 5y ago> Was ultraviolet catastrophe really an experimental inconsistency? It seems to best understood as a theoretical inconsistency: The theory predicts a diverging (infinite) value, which we know would be wrong regardless of what the experimental evidence is. Well, that theory also predicts that the universe can't exist for very long, which is a pretty big experimental inconsistency. > You also give the example of "the measured invariance of the speed of light in different rest frames," but Einstein claims SR was motivated by the invariance of Maxwell's equations (a theoretical consideration), not e.g. Michelson–Morley. Well, Maxwell's equations were relatively well experimentally verified by other experiments, so there were good reasons to at least tentatively accept their prediction of a constant speed of light* in any rest frame as a given. Even if the Michaelson-Morley experiment was not big on his mind, it was still relatively clear that this type of experiment could be performed with technology already available at the time, as the speed of light had been measured with pretty good precision already for a few decades. So, SR was not some highly speculative theory based only on extrapolating other theories, as solutions that only address BHILP but not other problems of QM/GR are currently. * or at least of electro-magnetic radiation, not sure when it became accepted light was EM radiation relative to the SR paper
- spekcular 5y ago> Well, that theory also predicts that the universe can't exist for very long, which is a pretty big experimental inconsistency. Sure, but I don't need to appeal to this fact to know there's a problem that must be solved. The infinities are enough. > Well, Maxwell's equations were relatively well experimentally verified by other experiments, so there were good reasons to at least tentatively accept their prediction of a constant speed of light* in any rest frame as a given. Even if the Michaelson-Morley experiment was not big on his mind, it was still relatively clear that this type of experiment could be performed with technology already available at the time, as the speed of light had been measured with pretty good precision already for a few decades. But again, even if MM couldn't have been performed, Einstein still would have had good theoretical reasons (consistency with Maxwell's equations) to posit SR. And indeed, this was the path the discovery seems to have actually taken. > So, SR was not some highly speculative theory based only on extrapolating other theories, as solutions that only address BHILP but not other problems of QM/GR are currently. Sure, but this is a difference in degree, not in kind. You accept that theoretical arguments for new phenomena that are not directly testable (at present) are acceptable if they're convincing enough. The question about BHILP under this view (which I agree with) is then about how convincing the theoretical arguments are. Hossenfelder, taken literally, suggests that no theoretical arguments will ever good enough in the absence of empirical evidence.