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PRC also unofficially communicated missiles drama weeks ahead to TW, so there wasn't any "crisis" either, but US sent 2 carriers as show of force because it cou

PRC also unofficially communicated missiles drama weeks ahead to TW, so there wasn't any "crisis" either, but US sent 2 carriers as show of force because it could, knowing PRC had no capabilities to counter. Force balance is different now, and for all the US hyping about increased PLAF flights into TW ADIZ or clipping median line last year, basically another crisis brewing, USN still only sent DDGs for strait transits because they can no longer risk using CSG as show of force.

LAC-Tech 5y ago
None of these issues constitute a crisis nearly as much as '96 - an alternate interpretation is that the PRC is still terrified of a CSG appearing in the strait so they deliberately do not cross US red lines, even when much closer US/Taiwan relations cross theirs.
- dirtyid 5y ago
  Alternate interpretation doesn't jive with analysis last few years that PRC has overwhelming A2D2 advantage in region. The parsimonious explanation is US doesn't want to put CVNs at risk or expose carriers to growing PRC ELINT capabilities, including around SCS islands where FONOPs are also conducted with DDGs or smaller vessels. Lanzhou came within 50 meters of Decatur in SCS a few years back, PLAN hasn't been not scared of US in backyard anymore.
  - LAC-Tech 5y ago
    Proof is in the pudding. PRC has not initiated another crisis since '96, Taiwan US relations are much closer than 30 years ago and have crossed many of the PRCs red lines, and the US military capabilities have not been standing still either. Looks like cooler heads have prevailed, which is good news for all three parties.
    - dirtyid 5y ago
      >Proof is in the pudding. Which neglects the point that USN aren't using CVNs to conduct FONOP in PRC SCS features that US does not recognize. There's no explanation other than being risk averse considering other developments. >PRC has not initiated another crisis since '96 The crisis in 96 was US initiated when House passed bill to allow TW president Lee to visit Cornell after first denying him. Current rekindling of US/TW relations have not gone that far, i.e. US haven't renamed Taipei representative office, consistently reasserted One China Policy, maintained strategic ambiguity, the upgrading of diplomatic contact with TW still adheres to PRC redline (not meeting TW Foreign Minister in DC reserved for representative of sovereign states). Though US is inching closer. Time will tell if cooler heads will prevail, with PRC domestic propaganda now talking about preparing for war if/when US plays TW card. Granted it's retired HuXiJin, but it's not good sign when he escalates spiels from "warning US" mode of last few years to "prepare the country for war", specifically describing "real sense of crisis" over current developments.
      - LAC-Tech 5y ago
        in the past 5 or so years, off the top of my head: - phone call between Trump and Ingwen - confirming US military presence in Taiwan (alleged PRC red line) - Officially released videos showing US military training with ROC forces in Taiwan - Higher and higher level US officials visiting Taiwan - Vice presidents of respective countries seen talking together The things you list that the US still is not doing, I fully expect them to start doing. It would be in the framework of the US one china policy, but it would continue the trend of salami slicing their way to dual recognition. It would probably be in PRCs interest to negotiate the status of Taiwan with Taiwan directly to save face before this happens. Not sure why you're so pre-occupied with the lack of aircraft carrier transit. Let's say one was targeted by PRC missiles while transiting in international waters. Do you think that would be the end of it? The repercussions of that would hurt the PRC more than vice versa.
        dirtyid 5y ago
        US troops for training, not redline, understood exception as resulit of TW relations act. I expect US to continue salami slicing as well, and I anticipate situation will turn hot eventually. There's no need to negotiate with TW, it's ultimately a US/PRC force balance issue. Re: carriers, I was highlighting to OP that there are constraints to US actions imposed by PRC, both militarily and in other examples, i.e. politically. You insinutate it's not US caution but PRC fear, which makes no sense in context of how careful US is shifting TW policy, because force balance is not disproportionate like during 3rd strait crisis anymore, US repercussions are approaching existential as well. As for who loses more, up for debate, but IMO a reigning hegemon has more to lose.

LAC-Tech 5y ago

None of these issues constitute a crisis nearly as much as '96 - an alternate interpretation is that the PRC is still terrified of a CSG appearing in the strait so they deliberately do not cross US red lines, even when much closer US/Taiwan relations cross theirs.

dirtyid 5y ago
Alternate interpretation doesn't jive with analysis last few years that PRC has overwhelming A2D2 advantage in region. The parsimonious explanation is US doesn't want to put CVNs at risk or expose carriers to growing PRC ELINT capabilities, including around SCS islands where FONOPs are also conducted with DDGs or smaller vessels. Lanzhou came within 50 meters of Decatur in SCS a few years back, PLAN hasn't been not scared of US in backyard anymore.
- LAC-Tech 5y ago
  Proof is in the pudding. PRC has not initiated another crisis since '96, Taiwan US relations are much closer than 30 years ago and have crossed many of the PRCs red lines, and the US military capabilities have not been standing still either. Looks like cooler heads have prevailed, which is good news for all three parties.
  - dirtyid 5y ago
    >Proof is in the pudding. Which neglects the point that USN aren't using CVNs to conduct FONOP in PRC SCS features that US does not recognize. There's no explanation other than being risk averse considering other developments. >PRC has not initiated another crisis since '96 The crisis in 96 was US initiated when House passed bill to allow TW president Lee to visit Cornell after first denying him. Current rekindling of US/TW relations have not gone that far, i.e. US haven't renamed Taipei representative office, consistently reasserted One China Policy, maintained strategic ambiguity, the upgrading of diplomatic contact with TW still adheres to PRC redline (not meeting TW Foreign Minister in DC reserved for representative of sovereign states). Though US is inching closer. Time will tell if cooler heads will prevail, with PRC domestic propaganda now talking about preparing for war if/when US plays TW card. Granted it's retired HuXiJin, but it's not good sign when he escalates spiels from "warning US" mode of last few years to "prepare the country for war", specifically describing "real sense of crisis" over current developments.
    - LAC-Tech 5y ago
      in the past 5 or so years, off the top of my head: - phone call between Trump and Ingwen - confirming US military presence in Taiwan (alleged PRC red line) - Officially released videos showing US military training with ROC forces in Taiwan - Higher and higher level US officials visiting Taiwan - Vice presidents of respective countries seen talking together The things you list that the US still is not doing, I fully expect them to start doing. It would be in the framework of the US one china policy, but it would continue the trend of salami slicing their way to dual recognition. It would probably be in PRCs interest to negotiate the status of Taiwan with Taiwan directly to save face before this happens. Not sure why you're so pre-occupied with the lack of aircraft carrier transit. Let's say one was targeted by PRC missiles while transiting in international waters. Do you think that would be the end of it? The repercussions of that would hurt the PRC more than vice versa.
      - dirtyid 5y ago
        US troops for training, not redline, understood exception as resulit of TW relations act. I expect US to continue salami slicing as well, and I anticipate situation will turn hot eventually. There's no need to negotiate with TW, it's ultimately a US/PRC force balance issue. Re: carriers, I was highlighting to OP that there are constraints to US actions imposed by PRC, both militarily and in other examples, i.e. politically. You insinutate it's not US caution but PRC fear, which makes no sense in context of how careful US is shifting TW policy, because force balance is not disproportionate like during 3rd strait crisis anymore, US repercussions are approaching existential as well. As for who loses more, up for debate, but IMO a reigning hegemon has more to lose.