5 ms·
You can (and folks do) authenticate in ways that don’t make individual blocks bigger. And any decent structural validation of the data still makes it reasona
by lazide 5y ago
You can (and folks do) authenticate in ways that don’t make individual blocks bigger.
And any decent structural validation of the data still makes it reasonably secure even without per-block validation.
GCM is also opened up to different types of attacks due to it’s structure. Such as if the data is gone, it may be impossible to figure that out without additional signature or metadata.
Without the correct key for AES, it is exceedingly difficult to construct a value that can result in a successful attack after decryption even for the simplest file systems (as compared to a very visible crash or disk corruption issue even without validation), and that blog post way oversimplifies the actual process. It also makes numerous flat out false statements about many encryption modes.
a trivial answer that solves every one of the attacks mentioned in that blog is using ZFS on top of a encrypted block device.
In each of these cases, for a successful attack, you’d need to generate a new block, or identify an existing block to replace a known block with, that would produce the attackers desired outcome. All GCM does is make it more detectable in the encrypted data if that happens.
Some modes mentioned, if watching the actual disk activity and doing chosen plaintext attacks, it could be possible to shorten the time to recover the underlying volume keys, but that is not helped immensely by GCM (necessarily).
It is going to be obvious in the system itself without the right key if someone tries to swap in a bogus block, because it will be gibberish/corrupt, if it is data used by anything or checked by anything.
AES-GCM just means you can tell when you pick something up, vs when you look at it if it’s damaged. And it does it at the trade off of adding a signature on everything. Sometimes that’s worth it, sometimes it’s not.
- loup-vaillant 5y ago> You can (and folks do) authenticate in ways that don’t make individual blocks bigger. First, name one example. Second, what do you mean by "individual blocks"? AES-GCM adds one authentication tag per message. A single message may contain millions of AES blocks, and the total overhead of AES-GCM over it will still be a single authentication tag (16 bytes). That makes it very similar to pretty much any authenticated encryption scheme out there.
- lazide 5y agoAh, your second question is a good one, and probably gets to the root of the disagreements. I was specifically referring to the context of things like block devices. There is no single message (in a sane way, anyway) for the device. Each low level block is the message, in the sense you are referring to. That's when inputsize != outputsize is a problem, as that 'message' is also fixed size. When I am referring to authenticating in a way that doesn't make individual blocks bigger, I'm referring to a HMAC signature in filesystem metadata or similar in this type of scenario. Out of band information. Practically speaking, even a basic CRC of metadata and file contents would make most attacks impractical. Which you could do with AES-GCM of course, by storing the tag separately. I currently know of no implementations that do so however, but I'm sure there are ones out there. It would require storing the tag per block, which doesn't sound fun or performant. To answer your second question in that context - everything from SSL to PGP/GPG, S/MIME, etc.
- tptacek 5y agoPeople have been saying stuff like "even a CRC would make attacks impractical" for decades, and what all they've managed to accomplish is an obstacle course for early-career academic cryptographers. Which, by all means, carry on: it produces great papers, and it's a great way to get new people into the field. But if you care about security, your ciphertext needs to be authenticated. Which brings me back to: all secure encryption expands the size of the ciphertext. If you're using XTS in a new design, you are doing something very wrong.
- lazide 5y ago
- tptacek 5y agoI don't understand your actual answer. You gave a list of cryptosystems that all suffered devastating attacks due to not properly authenticating ciphertexts; in the TLS case, several years worth of devastating attacks. PGP is an especially funny example. The only surprise is you didn't manage to work SSHv1 into the list.