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Adding to this, it's relatively trivial to have encrypted traffic transit your servers without the ability to actually view the traffic. This is basic stuff so
by bigDinosaur 5y ago
Adding to this, it's relatively trivial to have encrypted traffic transit your servers without the ability to actually view the traffic. This is basic stuff so I suspect you're not going to find the evidence from people who are citing podcasts...
- CamelRocketFish 5y agoCorrect, and when traffic transits your servers you know where that traffic is coming from (i.e. the target). I found your last comment rude considering the podcast I citied is an interview with citizen lab researchers; the people who research Pegasus malware. The podcast website also contains sources that I also linked to above. It’s “basic stuff” to look into what someone posted before making a comment like yours.
- bigDinosaur 5y agoHow do you identify a target individual purely from source traffic metadata...? Sure, you can identify them if you've totally rooted a target's phone and uploads all the data such that NSO group can read it - my point is that NSO group could offer transit encryption so long as they haven't backdoored whatever client is being used. The reason I bring that up is that it's precisely the service you might offer if you wanted more plausible deniability. I still don't consider this hugely complex stuff.