There's a 'steal all the money' DAO analogue of 'fire the missiles' for decentralized behavior. If someone achieves control, they can do _anything_ the system i

There's a 'steal all the money' DAO analogue of 'fire the missiles' for decentralized behavior. If someone achieves control, they can do _anything_ the system is authorized to do. Either the system can't fire the missiles, or it has to ensure the 'wrong' people can't achieve control, or that the cost of achieving control exceeds the value of the assets a controlling stake can direct. Even a reasonable cost incentive may not be sufficient if enough of the controlling stake is available to borrow, or there's enough liquidity to allow someone to buy, exploit, and resell a controlling stake within a single transaction. That aspect is unclear in this scenario. Did the attacker repay the flash loan with stolen funds (netting ~$100m) or were they able to resell (unwind? return?) the controlling stake within the single transaction? If the former, shouldn't there be $80m floating around (former) holders of 'beans' to at least partially recover? If the latter, how was there enough liquidity to buy + resell a controlling stake's worth of tokens?