Prevention of ossification isn't just a neat side effect of the "encrypt all the things" approach, it's the stated goal, and absolutely necessary. Normally, I'

Prevention of ossification isn't just a neat side effect of the "encrypt all the things" approach, it's the stated goal, and absolutely necessary. Normally, I'd agree with your concern, but I'm not worried about this specific one, because it seems entirely impractical and should thus remain an academic exercise: > Clients send the middlebox zero-knowledge proofs that their traffic is policy-compliant - this requires integrating software with the clients sending the traffic > performance is in striking distance of practicality; an example ... In such configurations ... client latency to create a proof is several seconds. In other words, it's still entirely impractical. This is rounded off by: > On the other hand, clients may have to store hundreds of MBs depending on the underlying zero-knowledge proof machinery, and for some applications, latency is tens of seconds.