4 ms·
Good riddance. (For those unaware, basically the only use-case of SGX was hardware-enforced DRM.)
by josephcsible 5y ago
Good riddance. (For those unaware, basically the only use-case of SGX was hardware-enforced DRM.)
- stefan_ 5y agoThe second use-case was MobileCoin, that cryptocoin scam Signal signed up for. Reflects well on their other crypto.
- teeray 5y agoI thought you could use it for HSM-type workloads too
- thinkmassive 5y agoLike a third party’s HSM running locally on your computer, heh
- kibwen 5y agoOn consumer CPUs DRM may have been the only use case, and indeed good riddance. But on the server side it's possible for tenants to use these hardware features to run workloads that the hosts verifiably cannot modify or inspect. In other words, this lets you use AWS/GCP/Azure etc. while keeping both your data and your code competely opaque to Amazon/Google/Microsoft etc. Disclaimer: my job is to write the software that makes this possible, and all our code is open-source and housed under the Linux Foundation's Confidental Computing Consortium: https://enarx.dev/ https://enarx.dev/ .
- bpye 5y agoI'm sure you're already familiar, but for others, there is also AMD's SEV-SNP [0] and Intel's TDX [1] that solve similar problems. Azure has SEV-SNP VMs in preview [2] - full disclosure, I work at Microsoft and was involved in this :) [0] - https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthen... [1] - https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/t... [2] - https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/azure-and-amd-enable-lift-and-shift-confidential-computing/ https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/azure-and-amd-enable-...
- exfalso 5y agoIn terms of security these technologies are (mostly) strictly worse than SGX, and there hasn't been nearly enough security research done on them. Also, the physical attack vectors remain (e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.04575 https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.04575). A small but interesting counterexample is x86 TSC: with SGX the MSR is modifiable by ring 0, with AMD SEV-SNP it is protected from the hypervisor. The real value of these newer technologies is not increased security, but rather increased usability. (Also, small sidenote: TDX relies on SGX.) I think the biggest contribution that cloud providers can bring to the table in the mid-term is mitigation of the physical attack vector. This would involve inserting themselves as a second root of trust in attestations (SEV has explicit support for this), which would mean that a real world attack would require collusion of multiple parties (pick 2 of Hardware vendor, Cloud provider, Software vendor).
- marcan_42 5y agoOf course, that requires tenants trust Intel's security. As a security researcher and given past showings from Intel, I wouldn't put much faith in SGX, even if they try to fix past flaws. SGX as a concept for tenant-provider isolation requires strong local attacker security, which is something off the shelf x86 has never had (not up to contemporary standards, ever) and certainly not in anything Intel has put out. They've demonstrated they don't have the culture nor security chops to actually engineer a system that could be trusted, IMO. Plus then there's all the microarchitectural leak vectors with a shared-CPU approach like that, and we know Intel have utterly failed there (not just Spectre; there was absolutely no excuse for L1TF and some of the others, and those really showed us just how security-oblivious Intel's design teams are). Right now, the x86 world would probably do well to listen to Microsoft, since their Xbox division managed to coax AMD into actually putting out secure silicon (they're one of the two big companies doing proper silicon security at the consumer level, the other being Apple and Google trying to catch up as a distant third). But given the muted response to Pluton from the industry, and the poor way in which this is all being marketed and explained, I'm not sure I have much hope right now...
- Jweb_Guru 5y agoHardware-enforced anticheat (for certain kinds of games) is a pretty cool potential usecase.
- nullc 5y agoThe usecase could have included all manner of useful pro-privacy and security usage-- but intel was extremely restrictive with access to the ability to use it in part because they expected to monetize the DRM usage.
- codethief 5y agoIt's also used extensively by Signal (not just for MobileCoin, as a sibling comment suggests).
- Sesse__ 5y agoInterestingly enough, I believe there's now no official way of playing UHD-BR on modern Intel systems (ie. you'd have to use an AACS/BD+ crack), since all certified players needed SGX. I don't know what this means for 4K Netflix, if anything.