>if I print money to build a new port... This is where the argument breaks down in my view. You cannot effectively centrally plan an economy. Granting these sp

>if I print money to build a new port... This is where the argument breaks down in my view. You cannot effectively centrally plan an economy. Granting these special favors for pet projects creates malign incentives. Those who are closest to the money spigot benefit disproportionally as compared to those who receive the newly printed money later. See also: Richard Cantillon. The decentralized market price discovery mechanism is disrupted by the malign incentives created by the money printers. Even if central planners could acquire enough information to effectively plan an economy, the problem of corruption and malign incentives remains. That said, central planners cannot effectively out-compete the decentralized price discovery mechanism of a generally unhampered market. They are limited and fallible bureaucrats, where the market participants are legion. Institutional group-think is yet another obstacle. Finally, even if you could conclude that your centrally planned port was not a bad investment, can you measure the cost of lost innovation? The opportunities not taken by the market because capital was misallocated by central planners for a port?