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The big benefit of ACME is that it verifies domain ownership at the correct level. DigiCert and the like will typically require domain verification at the TLD+
by jiggawatts 5y ago
The big benefit of ACME is that it verifies domain ownership at the correct level.
DigiCert and the like will typically require domain verification at the TLD+1, which is meaningless gibberish that isn't even remotely an RFC standard. There's no such "concept" in DNS, which is intended to be delegated.
So for example if I'm tasked with deploying a web app to "dev1.app.project.org.parentcompany.megacorp.co.uk" where the "project team" is based out of -- say -- Australia, then DigiCert will insist that I verify that I own "megacorp.co.uk", which... I don't. The parent company might not either. MegaCorp's UK head office does. They've never heard of me, and it'll take me a month to get through to someone who cares about my tiny, outsourced project down under.
This kind of thing has happened to me repeatedly across both corporate and government projects. A 2-week project can have a 1 month delay added to it because of this.
ACME gets it right, and nobody else does.
- justin_oaks 5y agoI encountered the same problem with DigiCert. I was trying to verify ownership OF A SUBDOMAIN (e.g. sub.example.com) and I was given a TXT record to add to my DNS. I added it to the subdomain sub.example.com but the verification kept failing. It wasn't until I added it to my domain (example.com) that the verification succeeded. Who thought that was a good idea? It was especially frustrating since I had verified ownership of the domain minutes before. Why do I have to do it again for every subdomain?
- derefr 5y agoMy understanding with how TLS was originally intended to be modelled, is that Certificate Authority-ness was supposed to be delegated as well; or at least, more and smaller entities were supposed to be CAs. (About the same kinds of entities who got IPv4 /8 allocations, really.) Big companies like Microsoft were definitely supposed to be their own CAs, enabling them to assert the authenticity of their own zones' subdomains' certificates without the help of any external CA. Generic commercial CAs were supposed to be for the use of regular contractors, not enterprise megacorps. For some reason (probably industry collusion), X.509 Name Constraints were there from the beginning to enable an extensible generalization of this, but we really missed the boat on supporting them, until eventually doing so became very very hard. We're still making progress toward enablement, though!
- iancarroll 5y agoThe private companies that do have incidental root certificates in trust stores, like Visa, are endemic sources of compliance issues. If any company should operate a CA, it should probably not be random enterprise companies. For one example: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Visa_Issues https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Visa_Issues
- shartte 5y agoI think the parent poster meant that if X.509 Name Constraints were widely deployed, Visas CA could be limited to Visa's TLD+1s. In the same way, government affiliated CAs could be limited to their own country TLDs, or a development CA could be limited to localhost.
- jiggawatts 5y agoThe problem is simply corruption. DigiCert and the like buy up the competition and entrench themselves where there is no business or technical need for their existence. It's pure rent seeking with approximately zero value provided in exchange. Let's Encrypt demonstrated that the marginal cost of a certificate is close enough to $0 to round down to precisely zero dollars. To see how deeply rooted this corruption is -- and it is corruption -- ask any major cloud provider like Azure or AWS whether they are willing to provide native ACME protocol integration to enable their customers to request Let's Encrypt certificates for arbitrary DNS-hosted services. You'll hear nothing back. "No comment" or "We're considering it". In other words: "We considered it, but then our boss's boss made it very clear to our boss that he was getting a kick-back from DigiCert and to never mention such topics ever again."
- nikanj 5y agoFortunately regulatory capture mandates EV certificates, to ensure snakeoil still finds it's market
- derefr 5y agoAFAIK, while EV certificates don't verify much, they do create a "chain of custody" leading back to a real "notary"-type person who registered the cert, and from there, to a real person who applied for the cert, who can be contacted using information held by the notary (esp. by law enforcement.) It's pretty hard to register an EV cert, use it to spoof someone else's domain, and then not get in trouble. ...at least, it's pretty hard if your CA is located in a Western country. Which is the big loophole here. The fact that we trust CAs headquartered in arbitrary potentially-unfriendly countries, to make claims about the entire space of domains, is pretty silly. Trusting e.g. the Russian CAs in the trust-store only when they make claims about .ru domains (a.k.a. the X.509 Name Constraint extension), would obviate a lot of the concerns people have about X.509's centrally-curated trust store model.
- iancarroll 5y agoThis isn’t really specific to ACME; most CAs are happy to sell domain-validated certificates only for subdomains. It sounds like this is a quirk of DigiCert mostly only selling org/extended-validation certificates, or them trying to make future sales easier. ACME-supporting CAs and other CAs are all held to the same compliance standards in the end, so nothing prevents the other from doing what you want.
- pojzon 5y agoAll depends on the type of the certificate you want to get and who will be your CA. Domain Validation certificates are insecure for quite a few types of security certifications due to how stupid easy it sometimes is to get your subdomain validated through social engineering. Manager X that manages a small project in subcontractor level can get screwed over way easier than security expert that is managing top level domain of specific corporation. So there are pros and cons of that solution.