> "On one hand a single incident is unlikely to be the end of a large company because companies exist to make money, and also because by the time a company

> "On one hand a single incident is unlikely to be the end of a large company because companies exist to make money, and also because by the time a company gets to a thousand engineers, it’s engineering function is already centered on managing complexity." Absolutely the companies themselves can be very robust. Some friends and colleagues who work for <big defence> tell me they don't fear for their jobs if a project is crashing. Internally such firms are structured to run dozens of projects, all well compartmentalised, such that if one fails they'll just get moved to another. The company itself is survivable via diversity (plus there's .gov money close at hand to bail out in an emergency). What concerns me about civil resilience is where we've got unexamined mono-cultures like Google Docs or GitHub that become de-facto pillars for countless other businesses. When Trump ordered Adobe to cut-off Venezuela that should have been a resilience wake-up call for everybody (and it prefigures the present Russian situation of course). There could be many reasons (more likely an unfortunate confluence of unrelated upstream reasons) that topple a vital part of public infrastructure. That's why big-tech monopoly, which erodes hybrid resilience, bothers the hell out of me.