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IMO once you’re into countervalue strikes you’ve unleashed something you can’t really control, so I’m skeptical of the game theorists who think you could kill e

IMO once you’re into countervalue strikes you’ve unleashed something you can’t really control, so I’m skeptical of the game theorists who think you could kill everyone in Boston or St. Petersburg and still have a diplomatic conversation that isn’t fueled by bloodthirsty revenge. As one US wargame AAR mordantly put it after accidentally killing off a few billion civilians, nuclear weapons are not the best way to communicate intent, even in a tabletop exercise. Unnervingly, Russian (and Soviet) policy has always assumed a smooth ramp from conventional to nuclear war and back, while US policy since Kennedy has seen nuclear escalation as an irrevocable step change in warfare (more reassuringly, China is, like the US, also unlikely to add nukes into a conventional conflict). Russian doctrine therefore encompasses using a limited demonstration strike to compel an end to conventional hostilities on Moscow’s terms. It’s hard to imagine NATO not responding, though, because the obvious effect of not responding is Europe living under Russian control enforced by the constant threat of nuclear destruction. What that response would look like is uncertain, though warplans certainly exist, but it would absolutely set us up on an escalatory spiral.

IAmGraydon 5y ago
> Russian doctrine therefore encompasses using a limited demonstration strike to compel an end to conventional hostilities on Moscow’s terms. What Russian doctrine says this? This sentence is a complete fabrication.
- JPLeRouzic 5y ago
  HillRat is not alone it seems: https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russian-military-doctrine-calls-a-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation-heres-why/ https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russian-military-doctrine-ca...
- HillRat 5y ago
  Sidorenko’s work is a good place to start, as it demonstrates the significant amount of effort (relative to NATO forces) that went into creating a Soviet doctrine of nuclearized ground warfare. But Russia has actually leaned more aggressively into limited nuclear use (starting with the 2000 MoD doctrinal review), since they’ve lost the relative advantage in conventional military mass that the Warsaw Pact had over NATO; in current Russian thought, the use of tactical nuclear strikes to control the political progress of war is a more important component of their perceived correlation of forces than in the days when they could overrun NATO in the Fulda Gap in hours with armor and artillery. (NB, prior to JFK’s New Look retool, the US policy in Europe was nuclear retaliation against Soviet conventional assault, so for a decade or so the US, and very much its European allies, were much more willing to use nukes than the Soviets.) Over the last decade, Russian leadership has repeatedly floated public hypotheticals (including the Zapad military field exercises) in which nuclear threats (or, in their war games, simulated nuclear strikes) are used to deter NATO from operations “beyond the edge of the Russian empire” (such as majority-Russophone regions in the Baltic states), which is in keeping with an evolving strategy generally termed “escalate to de-escalate” in the West. In fact, where Western game theorists developed an intricate theory of nuclear deterrence vs compellance, the Russian literature refers to both using сдерживания, seeing threats to compel and threats to deter as functionally identical, strategically speaking. (Compare with the PLA’s “Science of Military Strategy,” both editions of which discuss the PLA’s nuclear arsenal in deterrent terms in the event of a general war in East Asia against Western forces.) This is what unnerves game theorists about the Ukraine war and Russia’s poor performance there — if it weren’t for global public opinion (crucially China and India at this point), their doctrine certainly encompasses an escalatory demonstration strike (a tactical-yield weapon on a largely uninhabited area of farmland, for example) used to quickly “de-escalate” the war, freeze the lines at a position of relative Russian advantage, and force Ukraine into negotiations.

IAmGraydon 5y ago

> Russian doctrine therefore encompasses using a limited demonstration strike to compel an end to conventional hostilities on Moscow’s terms. What Russian doctrine says this? This sentence is a complete fabrication.

JPLeRouzic 5y ago
HillRat is not alone it seems: https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russian-military-doctrine-calls-a-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation-heres-why/ https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russian-military-doctrine-ca...
HillRat 5y ago
Sidorenko’s work is a good place to start, as it demonstrates the significant amount of effort (relative to NATO forces) that went into creating a Soviet doctrine of nuclearized ground warfare. But Russia has actually leaned more aggressively into limited nuclear use (starting with the 2000 MoD doctrinal review), since they’ve lost the relative advantage in conventional military mass that the Warsaw Pact had over NATO; in current Russian thought, the use of tactical nuclear strikes to control the political progress of war is a more important component of their perceived correlation of forces than in the days when they could overrun NATO in the Fulda Gap in hours with armor and artillery. (NB, prior to JFK’s New Look retool, the US policy in Europe was nuclear retaliation against Soviet conventional assault, so for a decade or so the US, and very much its European allies, were much more willing to use nukes than the Soviets.) Over the last decade, Russian leadership has repeatedly floated public hypotheticals (including the Zapad military field exercises) in which nuclear threats (or, in their war games, simulated nuclear strikes) are used to deter NATO from operations “beyond the edge of the Russian empire” (such as majority-Russophone regions in the Baltic states), which is in keeping with an evolving strategy generally termed “escalate to de-escalate” in the West. In fact, where Western game theorists developed an intricate theory of nuclear deterrence vs compellance, the Russian literature refers to both using сдерживания, seeing threats to compel and threats to deter as functionally identical, strategically speaking. (Compare with the PLA’s “Science of Military Strategy,” both editions of which discuss the PLA’s nuclear arsenal in deterrent terms in the event of a general war in East Asia against Western forces.) This is what unnerves game theorists about the Ukraine war and Russia’s poor performance there — if it weren’t for global public opinion (crucially China and India at this point), their doctrine certainly encompasses an escalatory demonstration strike (a tactical-yield weapon on a largely uninhabited area of farmland, for example) used to quickly “de-escalate” the war, freeze the lines at a position of relative Russian advantage, and force Ukraine into negotiations.