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> https://www.navalgazing.net/Nuclear-Weapon-Destructiveness https://www.navalgazing.net/Nuclear-Weapon-Destructiveness I'm a bit skeptical of this article, wh
by pizza234 5y ago
> https://www.navalgazing.net/Nuclear-Weapon-Destructiveness https://www.navalgazing.net/Nuclear-Weapon-Destructiveness
I'm a bit skeptical of this article, which seems excessively optimistic, since the estimation it does at the very beginning:
> Arms-control treaties limit both nations to 1,550 deployed warheads, although FAS estimates 1,588 for Russia and 1,644 for the US
seems to interpret numbers differently (deployed strategically/readily deployable).
Edit: the two articles complement each other in a very interesting way, for example: navalgazing.net assumes that nuclear weapons would target strategic targets, cornell.edu instead densely populated areas (I think reality would tend towards the first case).
The navalgazing.net article states that the soot research is from 80s/90s, while the reserch referenced by cornell.edu is from 2020 (I think in this specific case, the navalgazing.net is at fault).
- jdlee0 5y agoDeployed is not inventory. 1500 warheads ready to go. The rest cannot be flushed in an initial nuclear exchange. It's also a little complex in terms of the count. Bombers count as one independent of how many warheads they carry (the US has non-trivial nuclear bomber forces)
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- Freestyler_3 5y agoI would assume most nukes are small tactical nukes. Initial nukes will focus on nuclear launch facility's, command and control. So I think a significant amount of nukes will not be used at all.
- gentleman11 5y agoYou are gravely mistaken. The nuking of launch facilities means that each side will have to launch almost its entire arsenals within 15 minutes, guaranteeing a very large exchange to avoid having your own weapons become crippled. The dynamic leads to dramatically more detonations, not less
- Freestyler_3 5y agoThat would have to mean that ALL nukes are on launch sites ready to be deployed.
- HillRat 5y agoThe US has only one model of nonstrategic nuclear weapon (about 100 gravity bombs); most US, Russian and Chinese nukes are large strategic “city busters,” due to the dynamics of the Cold War. If one country genuinely believes that a strategic counterforce salvo was launched, the only “winning” (!) move would be to empty the silos in a mass countervalue attack, depopulating the enemy state. This, of course, implies that if you’re going to launch an attack and you think your enemy has a robust second-strike capability, then you go all the way first, because they’ll do the same to you. There’s a rich and horrifying literature on nuclear bargaining that’s suddenly relevant again, right up to a bunch of people (particularly in Russia) rehashing old HAK theories about being about to control the nuclear escalatory ladder in the midst of combat. It’s not a comforting time right now.
- checkyoursudo 5y agoI read something recently that suggests that Russia thinks it could not prevent a US counter-strike even with a full Russian first strike, which makes a full first strike by either side pretty unlikely, since the US posture seems to be no first strikes. In which case, the next most likely scenario might be: A destroys a city, B destroys a city in response, and then A tells B: "we are retaliating one more time, how about we stop after this?" And then everybody stops because the alternative is worse. I wish I could remember where I read it. It still isn't particularly comforting, but maybe better than the all-out-nuclear-war scenario.
- kortex 5y agoUS boomer subs are incredibly stealthy and can operate anywhere in the ocean, including spending much time and effort practicing under arctic ice (see the Ice-X series by SmarterEveryDay). I have no doubt US has the capability to camp subs under the ice, send launch codes via low frequency radio, surface and bring enough hurt to devastate Russia. The ability of Russia to effect a full decapitation first strike is on the order of nil.
- FpUser 5y agoHi Joe, your buddy Putin is on the line - I am about to launch a missile on New York. Do me a favor do not launch full scale counter attack in return. But feel completely free to drop one on St. Petersburg.
- jandrewrogers 5y agoNuclear warhead accounting for treaty purposes is not intuitive, they aren't always counting the things you would assume. US warheads are thermonuclear, so they use a tiny plutonium primary stage to trigger the main fusion secondary stage. The "hard part" is the plutonium trigger, and without it a thermonuclear warhead is harmless and inert. When the US decommissions a warhead for treaty purposes, they remove the plutonium trigger and put it on a shelf somewhere. The trigger assembly doesn't count as a weapon, and therefore it can't be deployed. However, since the plutonium trigger is not actually destroyed, these could be rapidly assembled into a deployable weapon. You would not expect any of these to be participating in a nuclear exchange. The US has relative few operational warheads but it probably maintains an inventory of 10,000+ plutonium triggers. For treaty purposes, they often count delivery platforms, like missiles and bombers. This makes sense when you consider that it is easy to re-hydrate a warhead on short notice if you have the necessary components in inventory but not so easy to produce an operational delivery system which may have a lead time of years.
- KptMarchewa 5y agoDo you think there is a possible nuclear war scenario where we get a "second round"?
- jandrewrogers 5y agoNot one where the first round employs most of the strategic deterrent. The logistics required to do a second round is unlikely to be available. The point of keeping inventory is that it is possible, if deemed necessary, to quietly scale up the number of warheads prior to any nuclear exchange, should the situation warrant it. Also, there is very limited capacity to produce new warhead assemblies, so keeping the old triggers around provides optionality for a relatively low cost while also creating a patina of uncertainty about capacity for adversaries.