3 ms·

You are incorrect. The MCAS system was built to work on a very buggy angle of attack sensor. They are notoriously unreliable. The max kept one on each side of

You are incorrect. The MCAS system was built to work on a very buggy angle of attack sensor. They are notoriously unreliable. The max kept one on each side of the plane (the airbus equivalent has 3 on each side). Further compounded by the fact that the (this was true at the time and theyve joined systems now) pilots computer only used the left side of the plane instruments and the copilots computer only used the right side. So no. Boeing fucked up in the first place by trying to stealth fix a hardware problem (stalling at a new lower angle of attack in the "same model airplane") with software. And then lying through their teeth about the impact of this. The equivalent military 737max with MCAS simply allowed the pilot to more forcefully adjust the flight control stick to turn it off. So they knew better. Companies attempting to skirt legislation in the face of better profits is always going to cause issues here. The entire max disaster was an attempt by management at Boeing to get pilots to be able to fly all 737s with basically no retraining.

scns 5y ago
The greed of the beancounters killed 343 people.
mlyle 5y ago
You call him incorrect but your comment is riddled with inaccuracies. > only used the left side of the plane instruments and the copilots computer only used the right side These aren't really "pilot" and "copilot" computers, but two redundant computer systems (each with redundant processors) that take turns running every other flight. > trying to stealth fix a hardware problem (stalling at a new lower angle of attack in the "same model airplane") with software Actually, trying to stealth fix a human-related hardware problem (stick feel and overpitching tendency, not stall) with a crappy software approach. > And then lying through their teeth about the impact of this. A big factor here is that runaway trim was considered a serious problem but also one that flight crews regularly train for and are tested on and are expected to handle. But MCAS gave this exam to pilots far more frequently than runaway trim had happened before and we found that crews often fail the test. The system design didn't try very hard to prevent this occurrence, because it was thought that flight crews could handle the problem when it occurred. > The equivalent military 737max with MCAS simply allowed the pilot to more forcefully adjust the flight control stick to turn it off. So they knew better. It's not really the same system, and it's not a "military 737max"-- I think you're referring to the KC-46, which is built upon the 767, and has a pitch feel control system also called "MCAS" that solves a related problem but overall operates very differently. > The entire max disaster was an attempt by management at Boeing to get pilots to be able to fly all 737s with basically no retraining. This worsened things, but the main issue is that there is a certification requirement -- https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.173 https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.173 -- for pilot pitch feel on climb which is hard to meet with larger engines under the wing.

scns 5y ago

The greed of the beancounters killed 343 people.

mlyle 5y ago

You call him incorrect but your comment is riddled with inaccuracies. > only used the left side of the plane instruments and the copilots computer only used the right side These aren't really "pilot" and "copilot" computers, but two redundant computer systems (each with redundant processors) that take turns running every other flight. > trying to stealth fix a hardware problem (stalling at a new lower angle of attack in the "same model airplane") with software Actually, trying to stealth fix a human-related hardware problem (stick feel and overpitching tendency, not stall) with a crappy software approach. > And then lying through their teeth about the impact of this. A big factor here is that runaway trim was considered a serious problem but also one that flight crews regularly train for and are tested on and are expected to handle. But MCAS gave this exam to pilots far more frequently than runaway trim had happened before and we found that crews often fail the test. The system design didn't try very hard to prevent this occurrence, because it was thought that flight crews could handle the problem when it occurred. > The equivalent military 737max with MCAS simply allowed the pilot to more forcefully adjust the flight control stick to turn it off. So they knew better. It's not really the same system, and it's not a "military 737max"-- I think you're referring to the KC-46, which is built upon the 767, and has a pitch feel control system also called "MCAS" that solves a related problem but overall operates very differently. > The entire max disaster was an attempt by management at Boeing to get pilots to be able to fly all 737s with basically no retraining. This worsened things, but the main issue is that there is a certification requirement -- https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.173 https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.173 -- for pilot pitch feel on climb which is hard to meet with larger engines under the wing.