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> I'm probably missing something obvious, but I just don't get how this helps ? In my mind it seems to add extra places for security issues to be introduced ?
by woodruffw 5y ago
> I'm probably missing something obvious, but I just don't get how this helps ? In my mind it seems to add extra places for security issues to be introduced ?
The entire point is integrity and a fully auditable chain of actions. Quoting the post:
> Performing these steps guarantees to the consumer that the binary was produced in the trusted builder at a given commit hash attested to in the provenance. They can trust that the information in the provenance was non-forgeable, allowing them to trust the build “recipe” and trace their artifact verifiably back to the source.
This provides a broad swath of integrity guarantees that are otherwise extremely difficult to assert for builds that you don't control: you know exactly which machine ran the build, that it wasn't tampered with or silently replaced, and that a particular OpenID identity has signed for the build. You can verify all of these steps publicly without having to keep a trusted keychain, and without having to trust that the signing/publishing parties securely store long-lived signing keys (since everything is ephemeral).
The critical thing to note here is that GitHub Actions is just the platform here. The techniques are all open, and sigstore is an open specification with an open implementation. You can do it all in-house if you'd like, or ignore it completely if everything you consume is already in-house.