> How does it handle Doze? Play Services requires its battery optimization to be set to unrestricted for FCM to work reliably. Other apps keeping a persistent

> How does it handle Doze? Play Services requires its battery optimization to be set to unrestricted for FCM to work reliably. Other apps keeping a persistent background connection (e.g. Signal w/out Play Services) require the same thing, so this is not specific to Play Services > FWIW, I have one metric (a rather stupid one, I agree) Why do you bring it up then? The amount or frequency of data transfer has zero indication of negative privacy impact. What private data could possibly be sent since Play Services doesn't have any privileged access on GrapheneOS? > "Google services" are 100MB+ proprietary code, sending god knows what to Google See my above comment. > I'm guessing you're speaking of microg implementation when you say "roll back the security model". He has already stated how microG allows signature spoofing which directly directly breaks the Android security model. But CalyxOS breaks the security model further: it also includes the F-Droid and Aurora privileged extensions which give the corresponding apps special privileges to install apps without user interaction. The proper way to do this (without breaking the security model) is to use the Android 12 API for unprivileged, unattended updates. > Just like the biggest (or maybe second or third, I don't really track that) corporation in the world on their flagship, while they are 50000 times smaller? It's not okay to stop shipping security updates for 4 months just because someone else is doing it. GrapheneOS shipped those updates with a team of only 5 developers. If CalyxOS cared at all about security and privacy, they would at a bare minimum meet the latest Android patch level and not break the Android security model.