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Hindsight is 20-20, I know, but Russia was the worst choice there was as supplier. It was not nearly as obvious 15 years ago, as it is today, but all the signs
by klausjensen 5y ago
Hindsight is 20-20, I know, but Russia was the worst choice there was as supplier.
It was not nearly as obvious 15 years ago, as it is today, but all the signs were there. We (I include myself here) were just not listening closely enough to the countries that knew Russia the best: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine.
The decision is also amplified by the meaningless end to the German nuclear program.
- bobthepanda 5y agoGerman dependency on Russian gas is a lot older than that. Ostpolitik dates back to the ‘60s.
- tmerse 5y agoJein (Yes and no). Helmut Schmidt even advocated for diversification in 1988 (no importer should account for more than 30% - of course more with oil in mind but the principle stands). https://www.zeit.de/1988/08/sieben-prinzipien-vernuenftiger-energiepolitik https://www.zeit.de/1988/08/sieben-prinzipien-vernuenftiger-... Contrary to this, Russian gas imports to Germany used to account for 40% of total consumption in 2012 vs 52% as of today.
- croes 5y agoWho would have been a better choice?
- gsserge 5y ago> It was not nearly as obvious 15 years ago, as it is today, but all the signs were there. We (I include myself here) were just not listening closely enough to the countries that knew Russia the best: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine. After living in Western Europe for almost a decade it's still shocking to me how much people here do not understand Russia.
- creato 5y agoIn my experience, right here on HN the dominant narrative was that opposing Russian gas infrastructure was just American protectionism for frackers. Similarly, opposing Chinese built telecom infrastructure is just seen as an attempt at American protectionism. Hopefully that continues to be a viable position, unlike depending on Russian gas.
- Mlller 5y agoContrary to the narrative common now, many European states and particularly a majority of Eastern European states seem to have been more dependent on Russian gas than Germany: - Hungary: 110.4 percent - Latvia: 100.1 percent - Finland: 92.4 percent - Estonia: 86.5 percent - Czechia: 86.0 percent - Slovenia: 81.0 percent - Slovakia: 75.2 percent - Bulgaria: 72.8 percent - Germany: 58.9 percent “Some of the countries have a figure above 100 because they import more than required for domestic consumption and export other energy products.” per https://thehill.com/policy/equilibrium-sustainability/3260553-these-european-countries-are-the-most-dependent-on-russian-gas/ https://thehill.com/policy/equilibrium-sustainability/326055...
- pell 5y agoWhile that is true, Germany is the economical powerhouse of the EU (and the fourth largest economy in the world). I think, these countries' GDPs combined are probably still smaller than Germany's. This gives Germany a special position here which is mainly why they're the center of attention here.
- riku_iki 5y agoThose all are small countries, with combined population less than Germany.
- pell 5y ago>It was not nearly as obvious 15 years ago, as it is today, but all the signs were there. We (I include myself here) were just not listening closely enough to the countries that knew Russia the best: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine. A big part of Germany's geopolitical strategy was (and partly still is) to act as a communication channel between West and East. Similarly to the EU which brought long-lasting peace in Europe through economical ties, the idea was to establish economical relationships with Russia to advance the relationship for a beneficial win-win situation both sides could live with. This, of course, was shortsighted in many ways.