Is this a wholehearted departure then from the whole "Simplicity Principle"? Not to be a complete ass, but in your view is there a defensible reason why every s

Is this a wholehearted departure then from the whole "Simplicity Principle"? Not to be a complete ass, but in your view is there a defensible reason why every single layer of the entire network stack does not guarantee integrity? It would make things more reliable, after all you would still be guaranteed integrity even if TCP is broken! But we don't do that because we acknowledge that maybe we should be solving issues at the poignant location in the stack rather than just haphazardly shoving things in because we need said things in general. I'm not disagreeing with your underlying point, really. I do agree that authentication is broken in that it fails to provide the actual guarantees we think it does. This is what I was getting at with my point above about issuing a right to talk to my service--that is, in reality, all any practical authentication system can provide today. You simply can't be certain the TPM your service stashed it's keys is secure without forcing attestation (again, problematic). Therefore, as far as your service can assume, your client may have just published the keys for the world to see. This leaves you in no better a theoretical position and it does not solve any of the problems identified with any other auth mechanism purely because it is not fundamentally.