3 ms·
In certain scenarios (bloc votes) the defection is fairly obvious afterwards, so the standard conclusion that always defecting is a bad strategy if the prisoner
by notahacker 5y ago
In certain scenarios (bloc votes) the defection is fairly obvious afterwards, so the standard conclusion that always defecting is a bad strategy if the prisoner's dilemma is iterated and [probable] defection can be established over time applies.
The quadratic maths tends towards making the gains from collusion very large, which means there is incentive not to defect even if detection is uncertain.
And bloc votes and ballots which aren't necessarily secret do represent some of the more plausible use cases for quadratic voting (corporate governance)
- samatman 5y agoThe more I think about it, I'm not even comfortable calling this collusion. Vote-buying is bad (some people disagree!) because we don't want people selling the decision, we want them to make it themselves. But a conversation like "I was thinking four points on A but I see why you're all in on B now, tell you what how about we go two for two on it" strikes me as a good outcome in a voting system. The fact that linear voting doesn't have an equivalent of it doesn't imply we should consider this 'collusion' rather than 'cooperation'.
- notahacker 5y agoIf the theoretical [economic] rationale for quadratic voting is that it incentivises voters to apportion votes perfectly in accordance with the relative intensity of their preferences, the fact they can achieve better outcomes by colluding/cooperating to vote not in accordance with the intensity of their preferences is a pretty major weakness.