I don't think there is a conspiracy here about tit-for-tat stuxnet or even if he is a "dirtbag". All AV shift trust from the system to the AV. That is the root

I don't think there is a conspiracy here about tit-for-tat stuxnet or even if he is a "dirtbag". All AV shift trust from the system to the AV. That is the root of the issue and it is an unsolved problem no matter where you try to secure something in the end there is always a compromise somewhere that boils down to "but eventually you need to trust something". If that something is owned by your enemy in a hot war it's game over. The minute a vendor can be leaned on by a hostile government (even they are not in the country like the founder of Telegram) and the interest is strong enough to lean on them (hot war) the trust assumption becomes problematic. How problematic? I think it doesn't get more urgent then in a hot war. Kaspersky needs to pack up in all NATO countries. Not just because they pay taxes in RU (also this is a good enough reason for me). But also because if you share data with a non-NATO country it immediately becomes problematic too if your business partner is using their products. The options under which they should be allowed to continue to operate is purely academic because it involves not only shifting all operations out of RU but also getting rid of any executive who moves to the new location that can be leaned on back home (e.g. family and friends etc). There is no middle ground because the minute these steps are initiated Kaspersky has good reason to feel mistreated by the West. So even they kept their hands clean until now they might start doing what they've been accused of anyway. Also if Positive Tech and others have been sanctions already some months ago there is no reason to give this much bigger potential threat a pass.