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In theory you could automate it, but that would require a different architecture. It's honestly pretty stupid that email is being used for this instead of havi
by giantg2 5y ago
In theory you could automate it, but that would require a different architecture.
It's honestly pretty stupid that email is being used for this instead of having a secure portal which could include things like RSA hard tokens, or even just passwords with 2FA would be a step up. Nothing is fool proof, but this sort of stuff is common with other sensitive information like finance.
- ryukafalz 5y agoHonestly, email would do the job too, if it was signed email. I’m pretty sure the largest deployed PKI system is the US federal government’s - it really feels like we should be able to deploy something for law enforcement agencies. (And in fact that’s what the legislation mentioned at the end of the article appears to do.)
- giantg2 5y agoDoes that actually fix the issue if they've compromised the security of the email server using real or generated accounts?
- ryukafalz 5y agoThe email server typically does not contain key material. If you’ve ever interacted with the military or related contractors you may recognize this card: https://www.cac.mil/common-access-card/ https://www.cac.mil/common-access-card/ That’s a smart card, containing a certificate that can be used to sign email, be used as a client cert for web access, etc. Now, it has moved the problem to some extent, in that now you have to secure the CA that’s issuing these certs.
- giantg2 5y agoI'm a little familiar with CAC cards from years ago. I don't believe they were using them to sign emails at that time. Thats different than the signing process I was familiar with. That would work.
- nonameiguess 5y agoThe DoD root CAs are pretty damn secure. They're offline in physical vaults on military installations. Compromising one of those is a far cry more difficult than some town of 400's local PD e-mail server. Granted, you only need to compromise a RAPIDs office to issue yourself a CAC, but that is still offline and on military installations (though often much less secure reserve/guard installations).
- giantg2 5y agoWouldn't the cert need to be specific to the individual for proper identification? So getting one for yourself might not provide the sufficient privilege.
- chipsa 5y agoThe cert would verify that a specific individual signed the email, with someone having previously verified issuing the credential to the right person (this sort of thing is usually issued as a smart card ID, so it's used for several things, and it's unlikely people lose it without reporting it lost and getting it revoked).
- giantg2 5y agoThey specifically mentioned issuing themself one, not stealing one.
- chipsa 5y agoYeah, issuing themself one through RAPIDS. You need to authenticate against RAPIDS to issue one. So you're looking at stealing a credential, and hoping you can get it done before it's noticed it's gone and revoked, and hoping that they don't go ahead and look at logins between when it was last seen and when it was revoked in order to see if there's any weirdness, at which point your credential gets revoked. If they did something similar for law enforcement, it would probably have the same sort of restrictions: you need to authenticate to get a credential, but to authenticate you need a credential. So you need to steal one to issue yourself one.
- logifail 5y ago> In theory you could automate it [..] Sorry for the somewhat off-message thought, but perhaps this kind of thing is actually more secure if you _don't_ attempt to automate it? Maybe the person receiving the request should actually go and look up the phone number of the police department or court who allegedly issued it/approved it, and then call that number (note: not the number mentioned on the request itself). Surely if that was the SOP, this kind of stuff would just stop?
- giantg2 5y agoWhere are they looking it up? Is that source secure? If it's just on a website, that could be easily corrupted. There's a huge number of systems across the US. I am assuming that a centralized system would provide better security overall compared to the many small and often neglected local systems. This would also standardize the process, reducing the possibility of some locales practice insecure processes.
- logifail 5y ago> If it's just on a website, that could be easily corrupted. Back in the day we had things called "telephone directories" (I'm showing my age somewhat) Is it beyond the wit of man to have the CIA/FBI/NSA/$TLA publish a "list of places to phone" when you receive an Emergency Data Request? If the source isn't on the list, you can ignore it. If it is on the list, phone the number on the list to verify it? This really isn't rocket science. At least not for those of use who grew up in an age where you could step into a phone box and open up a printed directory and look up someone's phone number...
- giantg2 5y agoThat is a possibility. It would likely need to be digital, not printed, to avoid stale data. The identity verification will still be less than what you could do with something certificates or RSA tokens since there's nothing guaranteeing the person on the other end is who they say they are (numbers change, area could be unsecured/unmanned, call redirected, etc).