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And, Ada's solution is the proximate cause of the first Ariane 5 exploding, destroying (IIRC) $1/2 billion in payload, unnecessarily. In the Ariane 5 case, an
by ncmncm 5y ago
And, Ada's solution is the proximate cause of the first Ariane 5 exploding, destroying (IIRC) $1/2 billion in payload, unnecessarily.
In the Ariane 5 case, an ill-tuned and anyway unnecessary out-of-bounds check was compiled into the inertial platform firmware, causing a debug traceback to be dumped to the rocket gimbal controls, which interpreted the traceback as instructions to steer sideways. To be clear: without the trap, the payload would have been delivered unharmed. There was nothing useful that could be done about the out-of-bounds value during the actual launch, and they knew that when they built the system. Extra points for dumping debug details down a channel where it corrupted correct data.
Europeans I have mentioned this to considered what did happen a sensible outcome.
- pyjarrett 5y agoThis was the first attempted flight of Ariane 5, which has ended up becoming one of the most reliable launch vehicles of all time. Also, according to NASA, because of its reliability, the Ariane 5 was used to launch the James Webb Space Telescope. The code reuse in the project was pretty poor engineering, they reused code from a different project which had different flight paths and characteristics, and didn't test it. The modern equivalent would be copying and pasting code from a completely different project, and then just shipping to production without testing it at all, even locally. Note that Ada is being used for the Ariane 6.
- ncmncm 5y agoYet, integrating over the lifetime of Ariane 5, the overwhelmingly largest single cause of loss-of-vehicle failures was a software bug that would not have occurred with a different implementation language. Spacecraft failures that can be blamed on failings of a particular language are very rare. There was a planetary space probe that failed arguably because it was coded in Fortran.
- pyjarrett 5y agoI don't agree with your point. Leaving in debug code, especially for an entire part of the launch that doesn't exist anymore by bringing in reused and untested code, seems like the real problem. I'm pretty sure integer overflow in this case would be undefined behavior, so you don't know what the compiler would do, especially since things were a lot more wild on the hardware side in 1996. Your point sounds like arguing that preferring Objective-C would prevent all those pesky `NullPointerException`s in Java since it allows sending messages to nil (null), but that's success by coincidence. If you read the ESA's report [1], there were a lot of things which failed before you even get to the language. This software failure is the only one in the entire Ariane series of rockets. Considering that this is 1996, the list of languages to pick from was pretty slim, e.g. this predates C++ initial standardization (1998), `enum class` and other modern C++ features. Even using just Ada 83 (of which 95, 2005, 2012, and 2022 succeeded and improved), I would argue that its forward looking features of preventing mixed mode arithmetic having properly typed checked enums and other features (like being strong typed) probably prevented a significant number of failures should other available languages at the time been used. [1]: http://sunnyday.mit.edu/nasa-class/Ariane5-report.html http://sunnyday.mit.edu/nasa-class/Ariane5-report.html
- ncmncm 5y agoYou miss that all the Ariane 4s were launched with the same flaw: any of them would have blown up for the same reason, if their vibration had peaked a bit beyond expected amplitude.
- pyjarrett 5y agoIt wasn't a flaw in Ariane 4 because it used a very different rocket flight path. This means the BH value which caused the error was physically impossible. > The value of BH was much higher than expected because the early part of the trajectory of Ariane 5 differs from that of Ariane 4 and results in considerably higher horizontal velocity values. > o) In Ariane 4 flights using the same type of inertial reference system there has been no such failure because the trajectory during the first 40 seconds of flight is such that the particular variable related to horizontal velocity cannot reach, with an adequate operational margin, a value beyond the limit present in the software.
- shadowofneptune 5y ago> Europeans I have mentioned this to considered what did happen a sensible outcome. Well, yeah. The firmware had been designed for a quite different rocket, the Ariane 4: https://www.bugsnag.com/blog/bug-day-ariane-5-disaster https://www.bugsnag.com/blog/bug-day-ariane-5-disaster I don't know how this is really a mark against Ada, it's an issue that would only be discovered by human intervention or by running a simulation of the rocket.
- ncmncm 5y agoIt would have made the Ariane-4 explode, too, if it had ever tripped. It is not a mark against Ada, particularly, it is a mark against brain-dead insistence on overflow traps. And, destroying a $half-billion payload because you insisted on leaving debugging apparatus in a production system would seem less obviously correct if the cost of the loss were deducted from your salary. So, people insisting it was a good result may be interpreted as expressing satisfaction with freedom from consequences of irresponsible behavior.
- pjmlp 5y agoMaybe having devs paying from they own salary the business costs of buffer overflows, stack corruption, and use-after-free isn't that bad idea, good move.