> I could reasonably see a version of this that uses a primary key and secondary key the secondary key would have two forms, one a plain form you place in a vau

> I could reasonably see a version of this that uses a primary key and secondary key the secondary key would have two forms, one a plain form you place in a vault or intrust to a third party and a form that can be generated with an OTP code. Not exactly multisig, but Signal demonstrated how they achieve a similar feat: Tech preview for secure value recovery, https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21838413 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21838413 (2019) Then there is also OPAQUE, which was demoed by Cloudflare Research a while back: Passwords that never leave your device, https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25346632 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25346632 (2020) > A major issue in the crypto world is people giving away their seed phrases. We could make this impossible by requiring a password + AES encrypted exports of the key. WebAuthn solves this by tightly integrating with the Browser and (TLS) hostnames. SQRL is another take on this, in particular, its key revocation ceremony is rather, err, novel: https://www.grc.com/sqrl/idlock.htm https://www.grc.com/sqrl/idlock.htm Keybase meanwhile implemented KEX to help facilitate authenticated key exchanges: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28064172 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28064172 A note: Public-key cryptography is super hard that it is baffaling folks consider it better (security-wise and ux-wise) than passwords; unless of course you've got the expertise of IETF CFRG or Signal or Apple: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5493442 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5493442