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Decisions Theory (so, statistics and economics) have also always relied on the idea of equivalence (I believe the notion is the set-theoretic one) for purely pr
by zwaps 5y ago
Decisions Theory (so, statistics and economics) have also always relied on the idea of equivalence (I believe the notion is the set-theoretic one) for purely practical reasons.
So for instance (drawing on the other reply in this thread about Leibnitz), to say that
x = y => f(x) = f(y)
is not really useful when the meaning of the equality is contextual.
If two choices are equal for one person (or prior distribution, utility function, uncertainty aversion etc.), they may not be "equal" if anything changes. And if they are, but other choices are not, the "equality" doesn't help.
By contrast, in if in the moment of where a context is fixed (we look at one potential set of decisions, one choice relation etc.) there exists an equivalence relation, then we can analyze the choice situation with math, and it's the equivalence of choices (with respect to this one relation) that does this. And then, naturally, if we conceive of a situation that we can analyze (or we have data on it), we can conceive the relationships that might have given rise to it.
And, as it turns out, there's typically infinitely many of those. And so, even lowly economists or statisticians must - in some simple way - grapple with what I would imagine categories are (?)
Would love to read more on this. Are there materials on category theory for non-mathematicians (and non-computer scientists thinking in terms of language theory)?
- Koshkin 5y agoHeh, in programming the Leibniz rule is sometimes (often?) not true. x == y does not necessarily mean that, for example, &x == &y.